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ABSTRACT
Extinguishment of debt through in-substance defeasance 
is a powerful debt management tool that enables 
corporations to eliminate debt from their balance sheets 
and record substantial gains on extinguishment whenever 
market rates of interest exceed the coupon rate of defeased 
debt. Corporations engaging in in-substance defeasance 
must conform to the provisions of Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 76, Extinguishment of Debt, issued 
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 1983.
Critics of Statement No. 76 charge that in-substance 
defeasance may be used to window dress the financial 
statements.
This study represents an initial test of the assertion 
that in-substance defeasance is chosen by firms as a tool 
for window dressing the financial statements. The major 
research question was: Can the window dressing hypothesis
be used to identify statistically significant differences 
in the financial statement characteristics of defeased and 
defeasible firms? A defeasible firm is one that could 
record a gain by engaging in an in-substance defeasance 
transaction, but chooses not to do so.
Five research hypotheses were developed to test the 
window dressing motive. Each hypothesis dealt with a 
specific financial statement characteristic: 1) earnings
growth, 2) nonrecurring losses, 3) current ratio, 4) debt- 
to-total-assets ratio, and 5) liquidity. Values for each 
of the five variables were computed for samples of defeased 
and defeasible firms. Data were analyzed using both 
univariate and multivariate (logistic regression) analysis.
The major conclusion of this study is that the window 
dressing hypothesis cannot be ruled out as a significant 
factor influencing the decision to engage in in-substance 
defeasance of debt. Empirical evidence showed that firms 
with high liquidity, high leverage, and declining earnings 
per share are more likely to engage in in-substance 
defeasance of debt than firms holding defeasible debt, but 
without those financial characteristics. There was no 
evidence to indicate that firms defease current debt to 
window dress the balance sheet by increasing the current 
ratio. Nor was there any evidence to suggest that 
defeasance gains were used to mask nonrecurring losses.
CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
Introduction
Extinguishment of debt through in-substance defeasance 
was generally unknown in corporate America before 1982. 
Before then defeasance was a term usually associated with 
tax-exempt debt. For many years nonprofit organizations 
and governmental units had relied on the defeasance 
provisions of their bond covenants to refund outstanding 
debt. Such provisions set forth the "terms by which the 
debt may be legally satisfied and the related lien released 
without the debt necessarily being retired" (AICPA 1978). 
Refunding (i.e., substituting new debt for existing debt) 
might be done to take advantage of lower interest rates, to 
extend maturity dates, or to revise the terms of payment. 
Defeasance provisions enabled tax-exempt borrowers to 
refund outstanding debt in advance of the debt's maturity 
or call dates.
In the most common form of advance refunding the 
borrower places the proceeds of its new (refunding) debt 
issue in an escrow account from which interest and 
principal on the original (refunded) issue will be paid
1
(Evans 1987, 38). After sufficient funds are placed in an 
escrow account, the original debt is said to be 
"defeased"-- i.e., it is no longer regarded as a debt 
obligation of the borrower and does not appear on the 
borrower's balance sheet. Only the new (refunding) debt 
obligation will appear among the borrower's liabilities.
In June 1978, the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) issued a Statement of Position 
providing guidance on accounting for advance refunding of 
tax-exempt debt. The Statement also provided guidance on 
how to account for the advance refunding of debt for which 
there were no defeasance provisions. Specifically, tax- 
exempt borrowers adhering to the advance refunding criteria 
outlined in the Statement were permitted to account for the 
transaction "in the same manner as defeased transactions 
because the obligation for the refunded debt is satisfied 
in substance, even though in [legal] form the refunded debt 
is not defeased" (AICPA 1978, 125, emphasis added). The 
criteria outlined in the Statement include the creation of 
an irrevocable trust in which U.S. Treasury obligations (or 
securities backed or collateralized by the U.S. government) 
are placed. The trusteed obligations must be sufficient to 
refund the old debt and must have maturities approximating 
the debt service requirements of the trust.
As long as U.S. Treasury obligations provided yields 
lower than the coupon rates on corporate debt, in-substance
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defeasance held little appeal for corporate borrowers. But 
in the summer of 1982, U.S. Treasury bonds were yielding 
double-digit returns--while many corporations carried 
outstanding long-term debt with coupon rates of only 5 or 6
percent. The stage was set for in-substance defeasance of
corporate debt.
The next section of this paper describes the first in­
substance defeasance transactions undertaken by
corporations and the regulatory actions that followed. In
section 3 the criteria for corporate in-substance 
defeasance of debt are outlined. Section 4 examines the 
legal, financial, economic and accounting implications of 
in-substance defeasance. Sections 5 through 7 present, 
respectively, the research question, an overview of the 
methodology, and the expected contribution of this study.
A Brief History of In-Substance Defeasance 
by Corporations
Exxon Corporation 
The- defeasance transaction initiated by Exxon 
Corporation in the second quarter of 1982 has served as a 
prototype for many corporate financial officers. Exxon 
defeased $515 million dollars in long-term debt by buying 
and placing into trust $313 million of U.S. government 
securities. The debt extinguished by Exxon carried coupon 
rates ranging between 5.8 and 6.7 percent. The U.S.
4
government securities acquired by Exxon provided a yield of 
14 percent. The difference between the carrying value of 
the defeased debt and the cost of the government securities 
was reported as an extraordinary gain (net of deferred 
taxes). Exxon described the transaction in a footnote to 
the financial statements in its 1982 annual report:
During 1982, U.S. government securities costing 
$313 million were deposited in an irrevocable trust, 
the principal and interest of which will be sufficient 
to fund the scheduled principal and interest payments 
on six debt issues of Exxon Corporation totaling $515 
million. The debt issues and government securities 
were removed from the balance sheet and, after 
adjustments including a provision of $66 million for 
income taxes, $132 million was taken into income 
(Exxon 1982, 28).
This single transaction in the second quarter of 1982 
reduced Exxon's debt-to-equity ratio by 0.45 percent. More 
importantly, the transaction increased Exxon's reported 
earnings by approximately 15 percent, "allowing Exxon to 
hold its reported decline in earnings to 51.5 percent 
rather than 58.9 percent, in the second quarter of 1982" 
(Agudelo and Harmon 1983, 62).
By the end of July 1982 Exxon was beseiged with 
inquiries from corporate treasurers interested in knowing 
how the transaction was arranged. Morgan Guaranty Trust 
had first proposed the idea of in-substance defeasance to 
Exxon. Exxon had been looking for ways to reduce its long­
term debt and had been actively engaged in swapping some of 
its debt for equity. But Exxon found itself unable to take
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advantage of historically high interest rates by buying 
back its low-eoupon bonds in the open market. Some of 
Exxon's largest bondholders were insurance companies who 
did not wish to sell their bonds because it would result in 
a loss on their books (Scherer 1982, 11). The opportunity
to retire the bonds through in-substance defeasance enabled 
Exxon to eliminate the debt from its balance sheet without 
bidding up the price of its bonds in the open market.
Kellogg Corporation
Kellogg achieved similar results using a slightly 
different twist. Kellogg turned over to its trustee 
(Morgan Guaranty Trust) approximately $65 million in cash, 
together with $75 million in long-term debt. The trustee 
then turned over the cash to several other companies in 
return for their promise to pay off Kellogg's debt. In 
effect, the companies accepting the debt received the tax 
and cash-flow benefits of deep-discount bonds. The tax 
benefit included deductions for actual interest payments 
and amortization of the difference between the $75 million 
debt and the $65 million loan, enabling these firms "to 
deduct more in the early years as interest expense than 
their actual cash outlay" (Business Week 9 August 1982, 65).
For its part, Kellogg was able to eliminate the l ong­
term debt from its balance sheet and record a gain of $5.7 
million or seven cents per share. The gain increased
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Kellogg’s second quarter profits by more than ten percent. 
The transaction was reported to Kellogg shareholders in a 
footnote to the financial statements describing the deal as 
a "liability assumption."
SEC and FASB Reaction
Shortly after Kellogg announced its version of in­
substance defeasance, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) decided to ban future defeasance 
transactions until the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) had a chance to consider the matter. One of the 
potential problems that troubled the SEC was the fact that 
debt defeasance might not absolve a corporation of all 
future liability. Suppose, for example, that a defeasing 
corporation subsequently files a bankruptcy petition. It 
is unclear whether the assets held in trust are beyond the 
reach of other creditors of the defeased firm. For this 
reason the SEC claimed that defeasance "doesn’t really end 
a company’s liabilities to its debt-security holders, and 
thus the balance sheet should continue to reflect existence 
of the debt" (The Wall Street Journal 20 August 1982, 7).
The FASB initially agreed with the SEC. During the 
course of its year-long deliberation on the matter, 
however, the Board reversed its position and in November 
1983 issued Statement of Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.
76, Extinguishment of Debt. SFAS No. 76 permits in-
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substance defeasance only if a number of criteria 
(discussed in the next section) are met by the defeasing 
firm. The SEC dropped its ban on defeasance transactions 
in early December 1983.
The SEC’s implicit concurrence with the FASB ruling 
attracted the attention of the U.S. Congress. In a letter 
to the SEC Chairman, House Representative John Dingell 
charged that the SEC behaved "in rubber-stamp fashion" in 
regard to the defeasance ruling and other FASB rulings 
related to off-balance sheet financing (Dingell quoted in 
Calvert 1985, 28). Nonetheless, the popularity of SFAS No. 
76 among corporate financial officers was enormous.
Business Week estimated that as much as $5 billion dollars 
in long-term debt was defeased in only 4 months following 
the issuance of SFAS No. 76 (Business Week 2 April 1984, 
96).
By April 1984 the FASB again found itself on the 
defensive when Morgan Guaranty Trust and other investment 
banking firms began touting the advantages of 
"instantaneous defeasance." This transaction exploits the 
fact that U.S. corporations with foreign subsidiaries can 
sometimes borrow money at rates lower than their host 
government. This creates an arbitrage opportunity under 
the provisions of SFAS No. 76. The transaction was dubbed 
"morning-to-midnight defeasance" by some members of the
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financial community since new debt might be issued and 
defeased within the space of a single day (Friar 1984, 37). 
Pepsico, for example, completed an instantaneous defeasance 
in the first quarter of 1984 that increased its earnings by 
about $1.4 million dollars. The gain was generated 
"instantly" by issuing new debt (denominated in 
Deutschemarks) at about 7.7 percent and simultaneouly 
applying the proceeds of the new debt toward the purchase 
of West German ten-year government securities yielding 8.35 
percent. The government securities were immediately placed 
in trust so that no liability from the deal ever appeared 
on Pepsico's balance sheet.
Although instantaneous defeasance met the requirements 
of SFAS No. 76, the FASB acted quickly to prohibit such 
transactions. On February 16, 1984, the FASB issued a 
proposed technical bulletin stating that the provisions of 
SFAS No. 76 were not applicable to newly-issued debt. 
Unfortunately, the proposed bulletin offered no guidelines 
for distinguishing between "new" and "old" debt. Instead, 
Technical Bulletin 84-4 (issued in September 1984) states 
only that debt issued in contemplation of defeasance does 
not qualify for the accounting treatment outlined in SFAS 
No. 76.
9
Criteria for In-Substance 
Defeasance of Debt
The FASB issued SFAS No. 76 as an amendment to 
Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 26, Early 
Extinguishment of Debt. According to SFAS No. 76 there are 
basically three ways to extinguish debt:
1. The debtor pays the creditor and is relieved of
all obligations with respect to the debt. This
includes the debtor’s reacquisition of its own 
outstanding debt securities in the open market, 
regardless of whether the securities are cancelled 
or held as so-called treasury bonds.
2. The debtor is legally released from being the
primary obligor under the debt either judicially
or by the creditor and it is probable that the 
debtor will not be required to make future 
payments with respect to the debt under any 
guarantees.
3. The debtor irrevocably places cash or other assets 
in a trust to be used solely for satisfying 
scheduled payments of both interest and principal 
for a specific obligation and the possibility that 
the debtor will be required to make future 
payments with respect to the debt is remote. In 
this circumstance, debt is extinguished even 
though the debtor is not legally released from 
being the primary obligor under the debt 
obligation (FASB 1983, par. 3).
Debt extinguished under the third provision above is 
considered defeased "in substance." Before a corporation 
can remove debt from its balance sheet, however, it must 
meet some fairly stringent rules regarding the type of 
assets to be placed in the irrevocable trust. The trustee 
can accept only monetary assets in the currency in which 
the debt is payable. The assets must be essentially risk­
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free. This means that for debt denominated in U.S. 
dollars, the assets are limited to 1) direct obligations of 
the U.S. government, 2) U.S. government guaranteed 
obligations, and 3) securities backed by U.S. government 
obligations as collateral under an arrangement whereby the 
interest and principal payments on the collateral 
immediately flow through to the holder of the security 
(FASB 1983, par. 4). Some government agency securities, 
such as Fannie Maes, do not meet these criteria.
Convertible debt is also disallowed since the defeased debt 
must have fixed interest payments and a fixed maturity 
date.
Once qualified securities have been placed in trust, 
the corporation's debt is considered to be extinguished and 
may be removed from the balance sheet (together with those 
assets placed in trust). Gains or losses arising from debt 
defeasance must be included in current income (under the 
provisions of APB Opinion No. 26) and, if material, must be 
reported as an extraordinary item (under the provisions of 
SFAS No. 4, Reporting Gains and Losses from Extinguishment 
of Debt).
Footnote disclosures of in-substance defeasance 
transactions typically reveal few details. SFAS No. 76 
requires only that "a general description of the 
transaction and the amount of debt that is considered
extinguished at the end of the period shall be disclosed so 
long as the debt remains outstanding" (FASB 1983, par. 6). 
Firms are not required to disclose specific information 
regarding the government securities placed in trust or the 
price paid for those securities.
Implications of In-Substance Defeasance 
Legal Considerations
The SEC was among the first to express concern about 
the legal status of defeased debt if a corporation should 
declare bankruptcy. This remains a major unresolved issue 
with important implications for auditors, stockholders, 
nondefeased creditors, bond rating agencies, and many 
others. A key assumption underlying the accounting 
treatment for in-substance defeasance is the inviolability 
of the defeasance trust. That inviolability, however, has 
never been tested in a court of law.
In-substance defeasance gives rise to other legal 
questions as well. For example, if defeased bonds happen 
to be subordinate to other debt on a corporation's balance 
sheet, does the creation of a defeasance trust violate the 
seniority of claims against the corporation's assets 
(Peterson 1985, 66)? What happens if a corporation 
violates a provision contained in the bond indenture of the 
defeased debt? "For example, if the indenture requires the 
firm to maintain its net working capital above a certain
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minimum, its failure to do so may have the same effect as 
bankruptcy" (Klein 1984, 25).
Bond rating agencies must also consider the possible 
fate of defeasance trusts subsequent to bankruptcy. It is 
conceivable that a defeasance trust might be subject to an 
automatic stay order by a bankruptcy judge. Such an order 
would trigger default on the defeased bonds as soon as the 
defeasance trustee failed to meet an interest or principal 
payment. The chairman of Standard & Poor's debt rating 
committee has said that his agency will not raise ratings 
on defeased debt unless attorneys provide assurance that 
the defeasance trust is inviolate--an assurance which 
lawyers have been unwilling to provide (Baker 1984, 22).
The legal implications of in-substance defeasance also 
concern bank regulators. U.S. banks immediately realized 
that in-substance defeasance provided an opportunity to 
improve capital and net worth ratios. Shortly after the 
release of SFAS No. 76 a bank in Rhode Island defeased a 
capitalized lease obligation on its new headquarters 
building, increasing the bank's annual income by 25 
percent. This transaction caught the attention of the 
Comptroller of the Currency who issued a warning regarding 
the possible adverse effects of in-substance defeasance 
(Bisky 1984, 67). A member of the Comptroller's accounting 
division posed the following legal question:
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Suppose a bank defeased subordinated debt and later 
failed--would the FDIC, as receiver, be able to open 
the trust and recover the assets? . . . And would 
insured depositors have to get in line behind any 
general creditors holding the defeased debt (Bisky 
1984, 66)?
Auditors have also expressed concern about their legal
liability in the event that trusteed assets are challenged
by nondefeased creditors or shareholders. Given that
millions of dollars can disappear from a corporation's
balance sheet without limiting the firm's legal liability,
auditors may one day have to justify in court the manner in
which a defeasance transaction is disclosed. Although the
auditor may be satisfied that the disclosure is in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), the courts may not be satisfied with this
criterion. Gaumnitz and Thompson argue that:
A defense based on conformity with a FASB statement 
might not hold up. The AICPA Code of Professional 
Ethics Rule 203— Accounting Principles requires 
adherence to a FASB statement only if doing so doesn't 
cause financial statements to be misleading. How the 
courts would resolve this issue is an open question 
(Gaumnitz and Thompson 1987, 105).
Any lawsuit directed at the auditing professsion is certain
to note the fact that the FASB reversed its initial
position on in-substance defeasance and that the Board
approved SFAS No. 76 by a vote of only four to three. The
minority opinion of the Board presents a strong argument
against in-substance defeasance:
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Though dedicated to a single purpose, assets in the 
[defeasance] trust continue to be assets . . .  of the 
debtor until applied to payment. Likewise, the 
liability continues to be a liability of the original 
debtor until satisfied by payment or by agreement of 
the creditor that the debtor is no longer the primary 
obligor. . . For a debt to be satisfied, the creditor 
must be satisfied (FASB 1983, par. 12).
Financial and Economic Considerations
Analysis of the financial and economic consequences of
defeasance has generally focused on two issues: 1) the
potential transfer of wealth from shareholders and
nondefeased debtholders to defeased creditors, and 2) the
cash flow effects of defeasance on stock prices. Roman
Weil, Professor of Accounting at the University of Chicago,
was one of the first to recognize the possible economic
consequences of SFAS No. 76 (Weil 1983). Weil believes
that the extinguishment of debt by means of in-substance
defeasance is entirely proper, but finds that shareholders
are losers in such transactions:
Before the transaction, the bondholders would have 
claims only on the cash, earnings, and assets of . . . 
[the defeasing firm], but afterward they'd have an 
additional claim on the distinctly less-risky cash 
flows provided by a U.S. Government security. That's 
the kind of wealth transfer I'd expect the financial 
markets to notice (Weil 1983, 76-77).
In effect, in-substance defeasance converts an
unrealized holding gain (i.e., the difference between the
carrying value of a bond and its current market value) into
a smaller realized gain (equal to the difference between
the carrying value of a bond and the cost of the government
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security used to defease it). To use Weil's example, on 
November 14, 1983, the 9 percent bonds of Columbia Gas sold 
for 80.125 percent of par. Thus the shareholders of 
Columbia Gas enjoyed an unrealized gain of $198.75 ($1,000 
par value minus $801.25 market value), assuming that the 
bonds were issued at par. If Columbia Gas wished to 
defease this debt, it might consider the 9 percent U.S. 
Government bonds of 1994. On the same date, the government 
bonds were selling for 85.16 percent of par. After 
defeasance, Columbia Gas would record a gain of $148.40 
($1000 minus $851.60), ignoring deferred taxes and 
transaction costs. In this example extinguishment of debt 
by in-substance defeasance would transfer approximately $50 
(or 6 percent of the previously unrealized shareholder 
gain) to the defeased bondholder (Weil 1983, 76).
No empirical studies of actual wealth transfers have 
yet appeared in the literature. This may be due to the 
fact that firms are not required to reveal many details 
regarding in-substance defeasance transactions. If a 
transfer of 6 percent is typical, then Exxon's defeasance 
in 1982 cost its shareholders approximately $13 million 
(representing the amount of previously unrealized gain 
transferred from shareholders to defeased debtholders).
Roden (1987) has analyzed the effect of defeasance on 
stock prices using the capital asset pricing model.
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According to financial theory, the price of a firm's stock 
is "the present value of its expected cash flows . . . 
capitalized at a rate reflecting the nondiversifiable risk 
of the cash flows" (Roden 1987, 82). The cash flow effects 
of in-substance defeasance on stock prices are generally 
negative. According to Roden:
Using cash to purchase a U.S. government security 
rather than investing in operating assets decreases 
the corporation's expected operating cash flow. It 
also decreases the corporation's liquidity, increasing 
its default risk. Finally, using cash to establish an 
irrevocable trust reduces the corporation's value and 
stock price by the after-tax fees paid to the 
investment banking firm for advice and the present 
value of the after-tax charges to service the trust. 
The asset pricing model suggests that the 
corporation's stock price should fall as a result of 
each of these influences (Roden 1987, 88).
The only factor that might serve to increase stock
prices is an improvement in financial leverage as reflected
in an improved debt-to-equity ratio. The stock price
effect of changes in capital structure, however, cannot be
determined with certainty. The effect depends, in part, on
whether investors perceive the improvement in financial
leverage as permanent or temporary.
In-substance defeasance has a capital structure 
impact on stock price depending on the perceptions of 
investors: If they perceive the change to be
temporary, there will be no permanent impact. If, on 
the other hand, they perceive the change to be 
permanent, then in-substance defeasance should lead to 
a change in stock price . . . (Roden 1987, 88).
Critics of in-substance defeasance often point out
that not a single penny is added to corporate coffers by
defeasance. In fact, the defeasance transaction usually 
begins with a major cash outlay for the purchase of U.S. 
government securities, followed by less significant cash 
outlays for advisory fees paid to investment bankers, 
service fees paid to defeasance trustees, and taxes paid on 
defeasance gains. Defeasance makes economic sense only if 
the discounted value of expected cash savings (resulting 
from the elimination of future interest and principal 
payments) exceeds the present value of expected cash 
outlays. Based on an analysis of six defeasance 
transactions for which sufficient information was 
disclosed, Mielke and Seifert found that the average rate 
of return on investment was 4.23 percent, with a range from 
4.0 percent to 6.01 percent--suggesting that "defeasance is 
not a particularly good investment" (Mielke and Seifert 
1987, 74). Agudelo and Harmon (1984, 63) estimated the 
return on Exxon's 1982 defeasance transaction at about 6.8 
percent. Since Exxon's transaction was timed to take 
maximum advantage of market interest rates, Exxon's return 
may suggest an upper limit for most defeasance 
transactions.
In-substance defeasance offers a tax advantage over 
outright repurchase of outstanding debt. For tax purposes 
in-substance defeasance is a nonevent. The IRS regards the 
corporation as the owner of both the trusteed assets and 
the defeased debt. Taxes on gains from in-substance
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defeasance are deferred until trusteed funds are actually 
applied to the repayment of principal. If a corporation 
were to repurchase its debt in the open market, such gains 
would be taxed currently. Thus, assuming that debt 
retirement is a wise economic decision in the first place, 
in-substance defeasance may be the method of choice. From 
the shareholders' viewpoint the tax advantage of in­
substance defeasance may, in fact, outweigh its cost (in 
the form of wealth transfers from shareholders to defeased 
debtholders). Lovata, Nichols, and Philipich (1987) have 
developed a model for choosing between methods of debt 
extinguishment based on an analysis of differential tax 
treatments.
Accounting Considerations 
The major advantages of in-substance defeasance from 
an accounting perspective are twofold: (1) the opportunity
to eliminate large amounts of debt from the balance sheet 
by a unilateral decision of corporate management, and (2) 
the opportunity to record gains on debt extinguishment 
whenever current interest rates exceed the coupon rate of 
defeasible debt. These changes in the financial statements 
can lead to significant improvements in key financial 
ratios such as the debt-to-equity ratio. Furthermore, 
management can extinguish debt even when corporate 
bondholders refuse to sell their bonds in the open market.
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In-substance defeasance may help to solve a number of 
difficult problems for management. For example, managers 
can use in-substance defeasance to generate immediate gains 
to offset anticipated nonrecurring losses. An offer of 
defeasance may provide management with an opportunity to 
renegotiate restrictive debt covenant provisions that might 
limit managment’s ability to increase dividends or obtain 
new financing. A defeasance transaction can even be used 
to reduce the likelihood of a hostile takeover since large 
amounts of liquid assets can be placed in a defeasance 
trust, permanently removed from the reach of unwanted 
suitors. Finally, managers of firms with earnings-based 
management compensation plans may use defeasance to 
increase bonus payments.
SFAS No. 76 permits managers to generate instant 
profits and reshape the balance sheet without seeking the 
approval or permission of equity holders. This prerogative 
has caused some members of the accounting community to 
express concern over the possible use of defeasance as 
"window dressing" for the financial statements. According 
to John C. (Sandy) Burton, former chief accountant of the 
SEC: "Anj time you get something that creates large
discretionary increases in income, it raises questions 
about the credibility of the income statement" (Burton 
quoted in Grant, 22 January 1984, 3). Accountants worry
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that defeasance may be used "as a smoke screen to hide poor 
earnings performance" (Chaney 1985, 54).
Defeasance gains have been called "illusory" since 
they boost net income and earnings per share without 
boosting cash flows:
Think about this. The company hasn’t received 
one cent in cash. It has, to be sure, saved money on 
a debt it owed. But the money has been saved over the 
next 30 years, and it gets an earnings boost that 
comes all at once, in the year of the transaction 
(Heins 10 October 1983, 67).
A professor of financial management at Wharton claims that
in-substance defeasance is "just balance sheet
manipulation. . . It's in the cosmetic category. It's more
appearance than reality in that it does not have any
significantly great effects on cash flow, and cash flow is
what ultimately determines value" (Blumstein 12 January
1984 , D 1).
If in-substance defeasance improves reported earnings 
and the face of the balance sheet without improving cash 
flows, why do managers engage in such transactions?
Numerous studies have shown that users of financial 
statements generally penetrate the veil of accounting 
cosmetics to analyze the cash flow effects of important 
transactions (see, for example, Ball 1972, Kaplan and Roll 
1972, Abdel-khalik and McKeown 1978, Biddle and Lindahl 
1982, and Ricks 1982). Corporate managers usually respond 
by citing the flexibility of in-substance defeasance as a
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debt management tool and the economic benefits it provides 
(McGoldrick 1984, 76-77). A well-planned defeasance 
transaction will have a positive net present value, an 
internal rate of return higher than the firm's after-tax 
cost of capital, and a tax advantage over other forms of 
debt extinguishment. These economic benefits are all 
worthy of management consideration.
Nonetheless, defeasance transactions can lead to some 
difficult questions at the annual meeting of shareholders.
For example, using available cash to purchase riskless 
government debt may not impress some shareholders as the 
most productive use of corporate assets. In fact, using 
cash in this way suggests that the firm lacks good 
investment opportunities in the area of continuing 
operations. Furthermore, shareholders could obtain the 
same returns by investing directly in U.S. government 
securities. How, then, can management justify receiving 
compensation (and perhaps even a bonus if the firm has an 
earnings-based bonus plan) for making such decisions? As 
one banker has asked: "Do the shareholders want Exxon to 
invest in government securities or in oil and gas 
properties" (Scherer 29 July 1982, 11)?
Exxon's defeasance made economic sense largely because 
the transaction occurred just as interest rates hit an 
historic peak. Thus Exxon could replace its defeased debt 
at lower interest rates if it wished. Firms that are not
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as adept at timing a defeasance transaction, however, may 
find that renewed inflation and higher interest rates force 
them to replace cheap debt with far more expensive debt. 
Some shareholders may conclude that in-substance defeasance 
is nothing more than financial speculation that exposes 
shareholders to unnecessary risks.
Finally, there is at least a possibility that the 
economic benefits of defeasance cited by corporate managers 
are not the true motivation for defeasance transactions. A 
key question is this: If managers could not record an
immediate gain and eliminate debt from the balance sheet, 
would they still engage in in-substance defeasance 
transactions? Are managers pursuing short-term financial 
statement benefits by buying U.S. government securities 
when they could be investing liquid assets more profitably 
elsewhere? Roman Weil warns users of financial statements 
to consider management's motivation for in-substance 
defeasance:
. . .  if mere window dressing appears to be the 
motive, beware. After all, why would management think 
it worthwhile to transfer wealth from its shareholders 
to its bondholders merely to report higher accounting 
income (Weil 5 December 1983, 51)?
Research Question 
In-substance defeasance has been aggressively promoted 
by the investment banking community since the issuance of 
SFAS No. 76, yet "most bankers report more interest in the
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defeasance concept than actual deals" (Baker 29 February
1984, 22). The investment research department of Bear 
Stearns & Company, for example, drew up a list of 72 
prospective corporate clients--i.e., firms that carried 
low-coupon debt on their balance sheets and adequate cash 
to complete an in-substance defeasance transaction (Calvert
1985, 24-25). To date, however, only 4 of these 72 firms 
have completed a defeasance transaction. A cautious 
attitude toward in-substance defeasance is also reflected 
in the results of a survey by Landrum and Posey (1986).
They sent questionnaires to the top financial executives of 
75 companies randomly selected from the Fortune 500 asking 
whether firms were presently considering the use of in­
substance defeasance. Twenty-eight usable replies were 
received:
Surprisingly . . . [the] data indicate that only 
36 percent of the respondents anticipate use of 
defeasance in the future. By an almost two to one 
margin, respondents were not considering the use of 
defeasance in the future, suggesting limited 
utilization subsequently. It may be that potential 
users feel that the market would "see through" the 
numbers in accordance with the efficient markets 
hypothesis or for other reasons believe that the 
method is not in their best interests (Landrum and 
Posey 1986 , 21 ).
Mielke and Seifert (1987) analyzed the effects of in­
substance defeasance for 46 companies that defeased debt 
between January 1, 1982, and December 31, 1985. They found 
that the average improvement in the debt-to-equity ratio of
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defeased firms was 2.42 percent, with a range of 0.01
percent to 21.58 percent. More significantly, the average
increase in the total income reported by defeased firms was
8.32 percent, with one firm reporting a 72.5 percent
increase from in-substance defeasance of debt. Mielke and
Seifert were also surprised at the number of firms using
in-substance defeasance to improve their current ratios:
This may indicate a new opportunity provided by the 
new accounting rules and may support Weil's (1983) and 
Chaney's (1985) claims that the accounting for 
defeasance encourages "window dressing." Companies 
might routinely accumulate funds in anticipation of 
satisfying maturing debt and invest those funds in 
short-term government securities. Prior to FASB 
Statement No. 76 there was no right of offset; that 
is, both the assets and liability would be shown on 
the balance sheet up to the maturity date. Now, 
however, the right of offset provides an opportunity 
due to the new accounting pronouncement. The 
immediately improved current ratio is a bonus for the 
results of a previously ordinary business function to 
secure funds for the payment of obligations 
(Mielke and Seifert 1987 , 71 ).
Despite the obvious potential for window dressing the 
financial statements, in-substance defeasance is vigorously 
defended by investment bankers and others as "a sound 
method to pay off long-term debt" (Baker 1984, 22). The 
significance of the window-dressing motive is confounded by 
the fact that cash savings from in-substance defeasance 
typically generate a positive return on investment. As 
noted previously the average rate of return for a small 
sample of in-substance defeasance transactions was 4.23 
percent (Mielke and Seifert 1987, 7*0. Whether an
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investment in debt extinguishment that returns, on average, 
4.23 percent is the best use of corporate assets or a 
prudent investment decision is highly problematic. It 
depends, in part, on the risks and returns of foregone 
opportunities. The issue that troubles many observers is 
whether corporations would irrevocably commit large amounts 
of liquid assets to an investment with such modest returns 
were it not for the immediate improvement in the financial 
statements that in-substance defeasance permits.
In the absence of management’s explanation, it may be 
impossible to determine the factors that motivate a 
decision to engage in in-substance defeasance. Certainly 
no firm is likely to acknowledge window dressing as an 
important factor in its decision. The importance of the 
window dressing motive in general, however, might be 
evaluated by investigating the financial statement 
characteristics of firms that have defeased debt compared 
to firms that hold defeasible debt but that have chosen not 
to defease. The research question is: Can the window
dressing hypothesis be used to identify statistically 
significant differences in the earnings trends and key 
financial ratios of defeased versus defeasible firms (i.e., 
firms that could benefit from the use of in-substance 
defeasance but choose not to do so)?
The window dressing hypothesis has a foundation in 
agency theory and contracting cost theory.
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The economic theory of agency is used to predict and 
explain the behavior of parties involved with the 
firm. . . Agency theory seeks to understand 
organizational behavior by examining how parties to 
agency relationships within the firm maximize their 
own utility (Wolk, Francis, and Tearney 1984, 72).
According to Jensen and Meckling, firms are "legal fictions 
which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting r e lation­
ships among individuals" (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 31).
Contracting cost theory helps explain the role of 
accounting information in the firm. Contracts governing 
firm activities often use accounting information to 
determine how the firm's wealth is divided among various 
parties (such as managers, stockholders, and debtholders). 
Since in-substance defeasance can have a dramatic impact on 
accounting information and related financial ratios, it is 
conceivable that management may engage in a defeasance 
transaction in order to influence the contractual 
distribution of wealth within the firm. In addition, 
management may realize nonpecuniary benefits from 
transactions which improve reported profits:
In a summary of the literature on managerial 
motivation, Williamson (1964, 30-32) reports that 
theorists largely agree on the fact that managers seem 
to pay great attention to their "security" and 
"reputation for excellence." It may be assumed that 
security and reputation are in some way dependent on 
reported profits. Consequently executives maximizing 
their own utility would pay some attention to the 
reporting methods their firm uses (Gagnon 1967, 192).
The choice of in-substance defeasance is not inconsistent
with efficient market theory. It is not necessary to
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assume that management believes that window dressing 
transactions will influence stock prices. On the contrary, 
management may be convinced that defeasance will have 
little or no impact on stock prices and still be motivated 
to pursue such transactions.
Overview of the Methodology
Defeased and defeasible firms were identified through 
a search of the NAARS (National Automated Accounting 
Research System) database in conjunction with AICPA 
Financial Report Survey 32, "Illustrations of Accounting 
for the In Substance Defeasance of Debt" (Goodman and 
Lorensen 1986). The NAARS database contains the annual 
reports of several thousand U.S. firms and provides full 
text search capabilities. The database search covered the 
period from January 1, 1982, through November 1, 1988. 
Earnings trends and key financial ratios for each group 
(i.e., defeased and defeasible firms) were compared using 
both univariate and multivariate tests.
The Wilcoxon ranked-sum test was used to analyze 
differences for individual variables. This is a 
nonparametric test that is appropriate for comparing the 
means of two independent samples when data are at least 
ordinal. The Wilcoxon ranked-sum test is a nonparametric 
alternative to the t-test and requires no assumptions 
regarding the distributions of variables. This is an
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important consideration for studies involving financial 
ratios since the distribution of financial ratio data is 
often nonnormal.
The Wilcoxon ranked-sum test is based upon a ranking 
of pooled data from two independent samples. The ranking 
is used to develop a test statistic (the T-statistic) with 
an approximately normal distribution. This statistic 
permits a test of the hypothesis that there is no 
difference between the means of the two populations from 
which the samples were drawn.
Since the variables pertaining to the window dressing 
hypothesis are interrelated, multivariate analysis was used 
to assess the simultaneous influence of all variables on 
the defeasance decision. Logistic regression analysis 
(logit) and probabilistic regression analysis (probit) are 
commonly used to analyze relationships involving a 
dichotomous dependent variable (such as the decision to 
defease debt). Both techniques overcome the difficulties 
associated with analysis of dichotomous dependent variables 
by using a curvilinear regression model. The major 
difference between the two methods is the shape of the 
curve used to develop each model. Logistic regression 
analysis is based on a logistic response function (the log 
of which is linear). Probabilistic regression analysis is 
based on the cumulative normal distribution function. 
Logistic regression analysis was used in the current study.
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The dependent variable in the logistic regression 
model is interpreted as the probability that a given 
observation belongs to one of two groups (defeased or 
defeasible firms). The statistical significance of 
individual coefficients is assessed by means of chi-square 
tests. A chi-square test is also used to assess the 
goodness-of-fit of the overall model. Logistic and 
probabilistic regression models produce very similar 
results and have been used in several accounting choice 
studies including Elliott et al. (1984); Bowen, Noreen, and 
Lacey (1981); and Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979).
Expected Contribution of the Study
Currently there is much speculation in the literature 
regarding the use of in-substance defeasance as a window 
dressing technique. Since in-substance defeasance offers 
economic and tax advantages, the role of window dressing in 
management decision-making has been unclear. This study 
investigates the influence of the window dressing motive by 
examining the earnings trends and key financial ratios of 
defeased and defeasible firms prior to the defeasance 
decision. The evidence indicates that the window dressing 
motive cannot be ruled out as a factor in management’s 
decision to engage in in-substance defeasance of debt.
Identifying potentially significant explanatory 
variables for unexplained phenomena can be a difficult
30
task. This is especially true in the social sciences since 
a wide variety of explanatory factors must be considered 
that are not subject to experimental control or 
manipulation. While this study does not prove that in­
substance defeasance decisions are, in fact, motivated by 
management's desire to window dress the financial 
statements, it does provide evidence consistent with the 
window dressing hypothesis.
Summary
The extinguishment of debt by means of in-substance 
defeasance is a powerful debt management tool that enables 
firms to eliminate large amounts of debt from their balance 
sheets without consulting debtholders or shareholders. At 
the same time in-substance defeasance can increase current 
income significantly whenever market rates of interest 
exceed the coupon rate of defeased debt. Critics charge 
that in-substance defeasance transfers wealth from 
shareholders to defeased debtholders and produces illusory 
gains that do not increase cash flow.
This chapter reviews the legal, economic, and 
financial implications of in-substance defeasance, together 
with a brief history of FASB Statement No. 76, 
Extinguishment of Debt. An analysis of the accounting 
implications of in-substance defeasance suggests that 
corporate managers may be motivated to use defeasance
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transactions as window dressing for the financial 
statements. A test of the window dressing hypothesis is 
described based on an analysis of differences in earnings 
trends and key financial ratios between defeased and 
defeasible firms.
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A review of the literature revealed two areas of 
research related to the current study:
1) Descriptive and analytical studies of in-substance 
defeasance of corporate debt, and
2) Studies of the determinant characteristics of firms 
making discretionary accounting choices.
This chapter contains a brief overview of research findings 
in both areas. The relevance of the current study to the 
literature is discussed at the end of this chapter.
Descriptive and Analytical Studies of 
In-Substance Defeasance of Corporate Debt
Mielke and Seifert
Mielke and Seifert (1987, 65) conducted a survey of 
firms engaging in defeasance transactions "to gain insight 
as to why companies might defease debt, to examine the 
impact of defeasance on the firm's financial characteris­
tics, and to investigate the type of disclosure provided in 
the annual reports." Survey results are based on a total 
of 51 defeasance transactions reported between January 1, 
1982, and December 31, 1985. Forty-six firms are
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represented (5 of which defeased debt in 2 different 
fiscal periods). A wide variety of debt was defeased 
during the survey period including corporate debentures, 
first mortgage bonds, promissory notes, and capital leases.
The authors attempted to analyze the motivation for 
defeasance based on footnote disclosures. Defeasance gains 
appeared to be a motivating factor for a majority of firms 
(29 of 46). Twelve firms defeased debt maturing within the 
current period (thereby improving the current ratio).
The authors examined the effect of defeasance on 
firms’ financial characteristics in 4 areas: (1) the
average change in current ratio, (2) the average change in 
the debt-to-equity ratio, (3) defeasance gains as a 
percentage of reported income, and (4) average return on 
investment. As noted in the previous chapter, the average 
change in current ratio was 6.13 percent, with a range of 
0.01 to 15.24 percent. The average improvement in the 
debt-to-equity ratio was 2.42 percent and ranged from 0.01 
to 21.58 percent. The average increase in reported income 
was 8.32 percent for firms reporting a profit. Three firms 
in the survey reported losses. Loss reductions for these 
firms were 1.14 percent, 11.0 percent, and 19.76 percent.
The average return on investment (based on an analysis of 
6 firms in the survey for which adequate cash flow 
information was available) was 4.23 percent, with a range 
of 4.0 to 6.02 percent.
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The survey revealed that many details of in-substance
defeasance transactions are not disclosed. SFAS No. 76
does not require firms to identify the debt being defeased
or the price paid for trusteed securities--information that
creditors and other users of the financial statements must
have in order to evaluate the merits of a defeasance
transaction. The authors conclude that:
The most important finding may be the lack of 
disclosure information that is provided, beyond that 
required by the FASB, to help investors and creditors 
evaluate the impacts of these transactions on their 
risk and return (Mielke and Seifert 1987, 76).
Landrum and Posey 
Landrum and Posey (1986, 16) conducted a survey to 
gather information "about the acceptability and use of 
defeasance as perceived by some of the major financial 
statement preparers affected by SFAS No. 76." Question­
naires were sent to the chief financial officers of 75 
firms randomly selected from the Fortune 500 for 1983. 
Twenty-eight usable reponses were received. Each subject 
was asked to answer 7 questions regarding past and 
expected future use of defeasance. Only 2 of the 28 
respondents said they had used defeasance prior to the SEC 
moratorium (August 1982). Ten firms (36 percent) said they 
were considering future use of defeasance. Only two firms 
expressed disapproval of the FASB ruling on defeasance, and 
6 firms (21 percent) felt that the financial reporting
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treatment of in-substance defeasance does not reflect its 
"real economic impact” (Landrum and Posey 1986, 23). In 
response to an open-ended question on the drawbacks of 
defeasance, 8 respondents said they were concerned that 
defeasance produces "artificial income” (Landrum and Posey 
1986, 24). The major advantages cited by respondents 
pertained to the additional discretionary power given 
management: "It permits the company to disclose its true
debt position" and provides greater flexibility in managing 
the company's capital structure (Landrum and Posey 1986, 
24-25).
Roden
Roden (1987) analyzed the financial implications of 
in-substance defeasance in the framework of the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM). Roden (1987, 84) argues that 
the cash used to purchase trusteed securities "may move the 
corporation beyond the optimal liquidity range, affecting 
stockholders' returns and stock price." Lower cash 
balances increase the corporation's default risk and signal 
investors that "operating prospects have deteriorated" 
(Roden 1987, 85). Since investors are led to expect a 
reduction in future operating cash flows, stock prices 
should fall based on the CAPM. An improvement in the debt- 
to-equity ratio, on the other hand, could have a favorable 
impact on stock prices. As discussed in the previous
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chapter, the effect of a change in capital structure on 
stock prices depends on the perceptions of investors. The 
author concludes that in-substance defeasance of debt may 
not be in the best interests of stockholders "when done 
principally to obtain an accounting gain" (Roden 1987, 88).
Studies of the Determinant Characteristics 
of Firms Making Discretionary 
Accounting Choices
A number of studies have investigated the relationship 
between a firm’s financial and operating characteristics 
and its discretionary accounting choices. Examples of such 
choices (some of which are no longer available) include the 
choice of successful efforts or full cost accounting by oil 
and gas producers, the capitalization or expensing of 
research and development costs, the use of straight-line or 
accelerated depreciation methods, and the choice of early 
or late adoption of accounting standards that provide 
flexible implementation provisions. All of these studies 
have used financial ratios based on accounting data to 
operationalize discriminating variables such as firm size 
or capital structure.
Deakin
Deakin (1979) was one of the first to investigate firm 
characteristics influencing the choice between full cost 
and successful efforts accounting by oil and gas producers.
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SFAS No. 19 (FASB 1977) mandated the successful efforts 
method of accounting for unproductive drilling costs ("dry 
holes"). Successful efforts firms capitalize only the cost 
of successful wells; dry holes are expensed immediately.
Firms using full cost accounting capitalize (and gradually 
amortize) all drilling costs. Compared to successful 
efforts accounting, the full cost method generally results 
in higher income, higher asset values, and higher levels of 
shareholders' equity (Sunder 1976 and Myers 1974).
Opponents of SFAS No. 19 claimed that a uniform 
accounting standard for drilling costs ignores important 
differences between firms. Specifically, opponents argued 
that full cost firms were generally (1) more aggressive in 
exploration, (2) newer, and (3) in greater need of external 
financing than successful efforts firms (Deakin 1979, 722). 
Mandating successful efforts accounting for all firms, it 
was claimed, would weaken the financial statements of fall 
cost firms and make it more difficult for them to obtain 
the financing needed for aggressive exploration.
Deakin (1979, 726) operationalized the firm character­
istics cited by opponents of SFAS No. 19 by identifying one 
or more discriminating variables for each characteristic 
(see Figure 2-1). He also included a variable for firm 
size. Deakin gathered data on each of these variables for 
53 firms (28 successful efforts firms and 25 full cost 
firms). A multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) model using
38
Indicators of aggressiveness of exploration: 
Average depth of exploratory wells 
Number of exploratory wells / revenue 
Development wells / total wells
Indicators of need for external capital:
Debt / revenue
Capital expenditures / revenue
Size indicator:
Revenue
Maturity or age variable:
Age of company in years
Figure 2-1. Discriminating Variables for Successful 
Efforts Versus Full Cost Accounting.
all 7 discriminating variables listed in Figure 2-1 was 
found to be significant at the 0.01 level based on a chi- 
square statistic of 18.2. The full MDA model correctly 
classified 71.7 percent of all firms in the sample. Deakin 
found, however, that a model using only the debt and 
capital expenditure ratios "gave results that were equally 
significant and had equal total correct classification 
rates" (Deakin 1979, 730).
A separate dichotomous classification test revealed 
that one variable alone (the ratio of debt to revenue) 
could correctly classify 73.6 percent of all firms--an 
overall correct classification rate higher than the MDA 
models. Deakin concluded that the debt to revenue ratio
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provides the greatest ability to discriminate between full 
cost and successful efforts firms, and that differentiation 
on the basis of size, age, or aggressiveness in exploration 
cannot be supported.
Deakin's analysis suffers from a failure to test the 
statistical assumptions underlying MDA--viz., multivariate 
normality and the equality of variance-covariance matrices 
across groups. Deakin’s classification rates may also be 
overstated since they are based on the same sample data 
used to develop the MDA model rather than a holdout sample. 
Estimation of classification rates for small samples (such 
as Deakin's) can be improved by using the Lachenbruch U 
Method described by Eisenbeis (1977).
Dhaliwal
Dhaliwal (1980) investigated the effect of a single 
variable, capital structure, on a firm's decision to use 
full cost or successful efforts accounting. As noted 
above, firms that use full cost accounting tend to report 
higher earnings with less volatility (due to gradual 
amortization of all drilling costs). Dhaliwal hypothesized 
that highly-levered firms would be more likely to choose 
full cost accounting because highly-levered firms are 
generally closer to debt covenant provisions that restrict 
management's ability to acquire new financing or increase 
dividends payouts. By choosing a method (such as full cost
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accounting) that increases reported earnings and reduces 
the risk of sharp earnings declines, management can reduce 
the risk of technical default and enjoy greater flexibility 
in planning future financing and dividends.
Dhaliwal compared the average debt-to-equity ratios of 
33 pairs of firms matched according to sales revenue to 
control for firm size. He found a statistically 
significant difference (at the 0.09 level) using a matched- 
pairs t-test. Comparable results were obtained using the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test 
(which does not require the assumption that data are 
normally distributed).
Lilien and Pastena 
Lilien and Pastena (1982) used 4 discriminating 
variables (see Figure 2-2) in their investigation of (1) 
the choice between successful efforts and full cost 
accounting, and (2) the choice of specific procedures
Revenue (size variable)
Age (consistency variable)
Dry wells/Total wells (exploratory risk) 
Debt/Shareholders' equity (leverage)
Figure 2-2. Discriminating Variables for Inter- and Intra- 
Method Accounting Choices.
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within each accounting method that affect the amount of 
reported earnings. The latter accounting choice stems from 
the fact that SFAS No. 19 permitted considerable 
flexibility in application. "For example, the areas of 
procedural flexibility included tests of impairments of 
producing properties, tax allocation treatment, and 
determination of recoverable reserves for computing 
amortization" (Lilien and Pastena 1982, 146). Thus, firms 
could influence reported earnings a little or a lot 
depending on their choice of specific procedures within 
each accounting method.
An unusual opportunity to assess the earnings 
variation between firms using either full cost or 
successful efforts accounting was provided by the SEC when 
it overturned SFAS No. 19 and narrowed the procedures 
allowable under both methods. In addition, the SEC 
mandated a retroactive adjustment of retained earnings 
under each method to reflect what earnings would have been 
if the prescribed procedures had been followed from the 
start.
Lilien and Pastena predicted that large firms would be 
more likely to use successful efforts accounting because it 
tends to minimize reported earnings. This is based on an 
argument advanced by Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 115) that 
large firms generally avoid discretionary increases in 
reported earnings so as not to attract the attention of
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regulatory authorities. Lilien and Pastena hypothesized 
that full cost firms would tend to be smaller, more highly 
levered, and engage in more exploratory drilling. Since 
the full cost method permits higher reported earnings, it 
reduces the risk of technical default for highly levered 
firms and makes it easier for them to acquire new 
financing.
Lilien and Pastena obtained data on 102 oil and gas 
producers for the period 1978-79. A probit model based on 
the 4 variables listed in Figure 2-2 correctly classified 
72 percent of the sample firms with regard to their choice 
of full cost or successful efforts accounting. This model 
was found to be significant at the 0.001 level based on a 
chi-square value of 21.1. This means that the probit model 
is significantly better in classifying firms by accounting 
choice than a naive model that randomly assigns accounting 
choice based on relative frequencies. Furthermore, the 
sign of each coefficient in the model was correctly 
predicted. A separate probit analysis of procedural 
choices within each accounting method produced comparable 
results. The probit model for procedural choices correctly 
classified 59 percent of the firms in the sample. Each 
coefficient in the procedural choices model carried the 
predicted sign and was significant at the 0.02 level or 
better.
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Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey
Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey (1981) studied several 
possible deterra inants of management's decision to 
capitalize interest costs related to assets under 
construction. Interest capitalization was a discretionary 
accounting choice prior to an SEC-iraposed moratorium in 
1974 and the subsequent ruling of the FASB (1979) that 
interest costs must be capitalized for self-constructed 
assets (SFAS No. 34). Since interest capitalization 
results in higher reported earnings Bowen, Noreen, and 
Lacey hypothesized that firms with earnings-based bonus 
plans would be more likely to capitalize interest. Firms 
constrained by bond covenant provisions might also be 
expected to choose interest capitalization.
Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey looked at 3 variables as 
measures of potential bond covenant constraints: (1)
dividends paid/unrestricted retained earnings, (2) 
income/interest expense (i.e., the firm's interest coverage 
ratio), and (3) net tangible assets/long-term debt (a 
measure of leverage). In addition, the authors analyzed 
the impact of firm size on the interest capitalization 
decision. The impact of the size variable was evaluated 
across all industry groups and separately for firms in the 
oil and gas industry--since regulatory pressures for this 
industry were especially strong during the Arab oil embargo 
of the early 1970s.
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Data were collected for 91 pairs of firms matched on 
the basis of their four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC). Using both the Sign test and the 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, all 3 debt 
variables were found to be significant at a level of 0.057 
or better. The presence of an earnings-based bonus plan 
was found to have no effect on the decision to capitalize 
interest. The size variable (based on sales) was 
significant for firms in the oil and gas industry as 
predicted. A t-test of the difference between average 
sales of capitalizing and noncapitalizing firms was 
significant at the 0.01 level. For all industrial groups 
as a whole, however, the size variable was found to be 
significant in the wrong direction— i.e., large firms were 
more, not less, likely to capitalize interest.
Multivariate (probit) analysis confirmed the results of the 
univariate tests. In summarizing their conclusions Bowen, 
Noreen, and Lacey (1981, 151) state that size was not a 
significant factor in the decision to capitalize interest 
for firms "other than the largest firms in the 'politically 
sensitive' petroleum industry."
Daley and Vigeland 
Daley and Vigeland (1983) investigated the factors 
suspected of influencing management's decision to 
capitalize or expense research and development (R&D) costs
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before SFAS No. 2 (FASB 1974) required firms to expense 
R&D. They considered 5 variables in their analysis, 
including separate variables for firms holding public debt 
versus privately-placed debt (see Figure 2-3). Since 
public debt is presumed to be more difficult and more 
costly to renegotiate, the authors hypothesized that firms 
with more public debt would have greater incentive to 
capitalize R&D costs than firms with private debt.
NPLEV = (Total long-term debt - Public long-term debt 
- Capitalized leases) / Total tangible assets
PLEV = Public long-term debt / Total tangible assets
DIVURE = Cash dividends / Unrestricted retained earnings
INTCOV = Income before extraordinary items / Interest 
expense
SIZE = Sales
Figure 2-3. Discriminating Variables for Decision to 
Capitalize or expense R&D Costs.
Daley and Vigeland performed univariate tests on a 
sample of 111 pairs of firms matched on the basis of their 
two-digit SIC codes. The authors predicted that firms 
capitalizing R&D costs would (1) be more heavily levered, 
(2) have lower interest coverage ratios, (3) have higher 
dividend/unrestricted retained earnings ratios, (4) have 
more public debt, and (5) tend to be smaller firms. All of
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the variables carried the predicted sign and all but one 
were significant at the 0.005 level or better based on the 
Mann-Whitney U-test. The dividends/unrestricted retained 
earnings ratio was not a significant variable in the 
decision to capitalize R&D costs.
The authors subjected the same matched-pair data to 
multivariate analysis using the generalized jacknife 
procedure developed by Quenouille (1956). This is an 
ordinary least squares regression technique for binary 
dependent variables that "develops multiple estimates of 
the regression coefficients (pseudo coefficients) via 
repetitive estimation of the model, while systematically 
leaving out a new observation at each repetition" (Daley 
and Vigeland 1983, 202). Although all variables carried 
the predicted sign, only the leverage variables (PLEV and 
NPLEV) were found to be significant. The authors conclude 
that "the results confirm previous findings by Bowen, 
Noreen, and Lacey (1981) . . . with respect to the
relationship between accounting principle choice and 
leverage" (Daley and Vigeland 1983, 209).
Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith
Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith (1982) investigated the 
effect of ownership control on management's choice of 
straight-line or accelerated depreciation methods for 
financial reporting purposes. The authors hypothesize that
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management controlled firms will tend to choose straight- 
line depreciation (producing higher reported earnings in 
the current period) for two reasons: (1) to reduce the
likelihood of takeover attempts by outsiders, and (2) to 
take advantage of earnings-based bonus plans. A management 
controlled firm is one in which no single party owns more 
than 5 percent of the voting stock. A firm is classified 
as owner controlled when one party owns at least 20 percent 
of the firm's outstanding voting stock, or when one party 
owns at least 10 percent of the firm's voting stock and is 
represented on the board of directors. Since ownership is 
more diffuse in management controlled firms, the authors 
argue that owners are less likely to monitor management 
directly and more likely to rely on indirect monitoring via 
earnings-based compensation plans.
In addition to the ownership variable, Dhaliwal et al. 
consider the impact of firm size (as measured by total 
assets) and leverage (as measured by the debt-to-equity 
ratio) on the depreciation decision. The authors use 
probit analysis for a sample consisting of 42 management 
controlled firms and 41 owner controlled firms. The probit 
model was found to be significant at the 0.01 level based 
on a chi-square value of 13.3. The ownership control 
variable (designated as 1 for management controlled firms 
and 0 for owner controlled firms) and the debt-to-equity
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variable were significant at the 0.03 and 0.01 levels
respectively. The size variable was not significant. The
authors conclude that:
. . . management controlled [MC] firms are more likely 
than owner controlled [OC] firms to adopt accounting 
methods which result in increased or early reported 
earnings. This prediction contrasts with one 
developed by Fama (1980). Fama theorizes that the 
market for managerial talent is such that there will 
be no difference in behavior between managers of MC 
and OC firms (Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith 1982, 52).
Hagerman and Zmijewski 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) examined the impact of 
5 economic variables (plus a sixth variable applicable only 
to the choice of inventory accounting method, see Figure 2- 
4) on 4 separate discretionary accounting choices: 
depreciation, inventory, investment tax credit, and pension 
costs. The dichotomous dependent variable for each 
accounting choice model was designated 1 for an accounting 
policy that increased reported income and 0 for an income- 
reducing policy. The expected effect of the size and risk 
variables has been discussed previously--viz., large firms 
with volatile earnings are expected to choose income- 
reducing accounting methods to avert unwanted regulatory 
attention and to reduce the likelihood of violating 
restrictive debt covenant provisions. The authors also 
hypothesized that capital intensive firms would choose 
income-reducing accounting methods because such firms do 
not record the opportunity cost of capital and therefore
49




Beta of accounting earnings (as a proxy for the 
variability of accounting earnings)
Capital intensity:
Gross fixed assets / sales
Competition:
Concentration ratio = percent of total industry 
sales made by 8 largest firms in the industry
Incentive plans:
1 if firm has management profit-sharing plan 
0 if firm has no profit-sharing plan
Effective tax rate:
(Used only in model of inventory accounting 
choice to control for tax effects of choice.)
Figure 2-4. Discriminating Variables for the Economic 
Determinants of Accounting Policy Choice.
tend to report higher earnings than firms in labor 
intensive industries. Furthermore, the authors assume that 
highly concentrated industries (i.e., industries with 
limited competition) will choose income-reducing accounting 
methods because they fear possible anti-trust actions or 
entry by new firms. Hagerman and Zmijewski summarize the 
predicted effect of all 5 economic variables as follows:
In sum, we have argued that firms that are large, 
risky, capital intensive or have monopoly rents have 
incentive to select accounting alternatives which
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reduce reported income. This incentive is due to the 
greater probability that these firms will be subject 
to political forces that will reduce their wealth. In 
addition, it appears that firms with market power will 
have similar incentives because of anti-trust activity 
and potential entry [by competitors]. Finally, the 
existence of management incentive compensation plans 
may induce the choice of accounting principles that 
increase reported income (Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979, 
145-146)
Data were collected on a sample of 300 firms drawn 
from 1975 annual reports and 10-Ks. The authors develop 
4 separate probit models (one for each accounting policy 
choice) using net sales as a measure of firm size. A 
second set of models is based on total assets as a measure 
of size. The accounting choice models for depreciation 
(accelerated versus straight-line) and inventory (LIFO 
versus FIFO) were found to be significant at the 0.01 and 
0.05 levels respectively. The models for investment tax 
credit (flow-through versus deferral) and the amortization 
of past service pension costs were not significant at the
0.05 level. Within accounting choice models the 
statistical significance of individual independent 
variables varied greatly across accounting choices. The 
authors conclude:
Our results are broadly consistent with our 
hypotheses since two of our four models are 
statistically significant. However, the important 
explanatory variables tend to be different for each 
accounting principle tested. This fact suggests that 
management may act as if they use different variables 
to make each decision (Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979, 
157).
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In an extension of their 1979 study (Zmijewski and 
Hagerman 1981) the authors consider the possibility that 
management may rely on a "portfolio" of accounting choices 
to achieve a given strategy for reported income. The 
results of models based on accounting choice portfolios 
were found to be much stronger than the separate choice 
models developed in the 1979 study. A portfolio approach 
to defeasance decisions, however, appears inappropriate.
Since the financial statement effect of a decision to use 
in-substance defeasance is generally confined to a single 
reporting period, its use as part of a portfolio of 
accounting choices is necessarily limited. A firm’s 
ability to generate increases in reported income ends when 
the firm exhausts its supply of low-interest debt. In 
fact, the usefulness of in-substance defeasance as a 
potential window dressing device depends, in part, on its 
ability to provide a nquick fix" for temporary problems 
without requiring a change in the firm's ongoing portfolio 
of accounting policies.
Ayres
Ayres (1986) investigated the determinants of early 
versus late adoption of SFAS No. 52, Foreign Currency 
Translation (FASB 1981). SFAS No. 52 permits firms to 
exclude gains and losses related to foreign currency 
translation from the determination of net income (reversing
the accounting treatment previously prescribed under SFAS 
No. 8). The FASB issued SFAS No. 52 in December 1981 and 
encouraged immediate adoption. Firms with fiscal years 
beginning on or after December 15, 1982, were required to 
adopt the new standard. Ayres investigated 5 firm 
characteristics expected to discriminate between early
(1981) and late (1982 or 1983) adopters (see Figure 2-5).
CEPS = Percentage change in primary earnings per share
from 1980 to 1981 (excluding extraordinary items, 
discontinued operations, and the per share effect 
of 1981 adoption of SFAS No. 52). This variable 
was coded 0 for late adopters since the earnings 
effect was indeterminant.
COVINT = (Income before extraordinary items, discontinued 
operations, and the income effect of early 
adoption of SFAS No. 52) / Interest expense
DIVURE = (Preferred dividends + common dividends) / 
unrestricted retained earnings x 100
SIZE = Total assets (in millions)
DO = Percentage of stock held by directors and
officers as a group
Figure 2-5. Discriminating Variables for Early Versus Late 
Adopters of SFAS No. 52.
Since the U.S. dollar strengthened against most major 
currencies during 1981, early adopters could show higher 
earnings under SFAS No. 52 (because translation losses 
would not be charged to current income). Based on the
assumption that early adoption increases reported earnings, 
Ayres hypothesized that early adopters (1) would tend to be 
management controlled (see discussion of Dhaliwal 1980 
above), (2) would tend to be smaller, (3) would tend to 
have a smaller percentage growth in pre-adoption earnings, 
(4) would tend have lower interest coverage ratios, and (5) 
would tend to have higher ratios of dividends to 
unrestricted retained earnings. The author predicted 
smaller pre-adoption earnings growth for early adopters 
based on the belief that managers of firms with low 
earnings growth would choose to increase earnings in order 
to increase earnings-based bonus payments. The rationale 
for each of the remaining hypotheses has already been 
described in connection with accounting choice studies 
cited earlier.
Ayres collected data on a sample consisting of 103 
early adopters and 129 late adopters. Differences between 
early and late adopters carried the predicted sign for all 
variables. Univariate analysis (based on the Mann-Whitney 
U-test) indicated that 4 of the 5 variables were 
significant at the 0.05 level or better. The management 
control variable (DO) did not differ significantly between 
the two groups. Multivariate analysis based on a logistic 
(logit) model produced coefficients with the predicted sign 
for all variables. In addition, all of the variables were 
significant at the 0.05 level or better. The overall model
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was found to be significant at the 0.0001 level based on a 
chi-square value of 51.14. Ayres concluded that "the 
results are consistent with previous research which 
suggests that systematic differences exist between firms 
that choose alternative accounting policies" (1986, 156).
Relevance of the Current Study 
to the Literature
The current study extends research in the area of 
voluntary accounting choices and is the first to collect 
and analyze empirical data on the determinants of 
management's decision to engage in in-substance defeasance 
of debt. All of the empirical data published to date have 
been descriptive or analytical in nature and none has 
reported on defeasance transactions subsequent to 1985.
The current study updates the literature based on available 
annual reports and 10-K statements through November 1,
1988 .
The current study also fills a void in the literature 
regarding the potential use of accounting methods for 
window dressing the financial statements. Although many , 
members of the accounting community have voiced concern 
over the use of SFAS No. 76 as a window dressing technique, 
accounting researchers have virtually ignored the 
possibility that accounting choices may be used to 
influence user perceptions of financial statement
disclosures. This indifference may be the result of early 
market studies of the impact of accounting methods on stock 
prices (Ball 1972, Kaplan and Roll 1972, and many others). 
These studies found that investors were not misled by 
changes in accounting methods. This does not mean, 
however, that managers will ignore window dressing 
opportunities--particularly during the 1980s when financial 
statements are scrutinized for signs of inept or 
inefficient management by those who specialize in corporate 
takeovers. The results of efficient market studies should 
not be interpreted to mean that intelligent managers will 
ignore the effect of accounting choices on the perceptions 
of financial statement users. As noted by Dhaliwal, 
Salamon, and Smith (1982, 43), even if management cannot 
influence stock prices by its choice of accounting methods, 
it is still reasonable to assume "that the accounting 
methods chosen by management can convince some of the 
firm's shareholders that management is doing a creditable 




The purpose of this chapter is to outline the 
methodology used in this study. The first section presents 
the research question and related hypotheses. Sections 2 
and 3 describe, respectively, the data collection 
procedures and statistical tests performed. Section 4 
provides an explanation of the the logistic regression 
model and its relevance to the current study. The final 
section describes the limitations of the study.
Research Question and Hypotheses 
This study represents an initial test of the assertion 
that in-substance defeasance is chosen by firms as a tool 
for window dressing the financial statements. The major 
research question is: Can the window dressing hypothesis
be used to identify statistically significant differences 
in the financial statement characteristics of defeased and 
defeasible firms? A defeasible firm is one that could 
record a gain by engaging in an in-substance defeasance 
transaction but chooses not to do so. Specifically, a 
defeasible firm has low-interest debt relative to 
prevailing yields on risk-free (government) securities. As
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mentioned in Chapter 1, the investment research department 
of Bear Stearns & Company compiled a list of 72 defeasible 
firms (Calvert 1985, 24-25). To date only 4 of those firms 
have completed an in-substance defeasance transaction. The 
fact that many defeasible firms refrain from in-substance 
defeasance suggests that the opportunity to improve debt 
ratios and record a gain in current income does not have 
the same motivating influence for all firms. The question 
is whether the earnings growth and applicable financial 
ratios of defeasing firms are systematically different from 
the earnings growth and financial ratios of defeasible 
firms. If such systematic differences exist, then the 
window dressing hypothesis cannot be ruled out as a 
motivating factor affecting management's use of in­
substance defeasance.
Research Hypotheses 
If window dressing is a motivating factor in manage­
ment's decision to defease debt, it follows that management 
is seeking to improve one or more aspects of its financial 
statements. The areas that are directly affected by an in­
substance defeasance transaction include (1) reported 
income (and earnings per share), and (2) debt-related 
financial ratios. Since the ability to generate defeasance 
gains is limited by the amount of defeasible debt on a 
firm's balance sheet, it is hypothesized that managers are
more likely to use defeasance to alleviate temporary rather 
than long-term deficiencies--such as temporary declines in 
earnings growth or anticipated nonrecurring losses. Stated 
in the alternative form, it is hypothesized that:
H 1 : Defeasing firms have a smaller percentage growth
in earnings (exclusive of defeasance gains) than 
defeasible firms.
H 2 : Defeasing firms have a higher amount of pre­
defeasance nonrecurring loss (as a percentage of 
total assets) than defeasible firms.
Improvement in debt-related financial ratios depends 
on the type of debt defeased (i.e., current or noncurrent). 
As noted in Chapter 1, Mielke and Seifert (1987, 71) found 
improvement in the current ratios of many defeasing firms. 
SFAS No. 76 enables firms to dispose of maturing debt as 
soon as funds are available to make repayment. The firm 
can thereby eliminate maturing debt from the current 
liabilities section of its balance sheet in advance of the 
actual repayment date. Defeasance of long-term debt, on 
the other hand, permits improvement in leverage ratios such 
as the debt-to-total-assets ratio. Stated in the 
alternative form, it is hypothesized that:
H3: Firms defeasing current debt have a lower pre­
defeasance current ratio than defeasible firms.
H 4 : Firms defeasing long-term debt have a higher pre­
defeasance debt-to-total-assets ratio than 
defeasible firms.
Management may also be motivated to use in-substance 
defeasance to reduce large cash balances on the balance
sheet, reducing the firm's attractiveness to potential 
suitors and ensuring that excess cash balances are 
unavailable to those seeking to acquire the firm. In this 
case defeasance might be used as window dressing aimed at 
specific target audience— viz., unwanted suitors. Stated 
in the alternative form, it is hypothesized that:
H 5 : Defeasing firms have a higher level of pre­
defeasance liquid assets (as a percentage of 
total assets) than defeasible firms.
Operational definitions for the discriminating variables
used in these hypotheses are summarized in Figure 3-1.
Data Collection
The initial sample of defeased firms was drawn from 
the National Automated Accounting Research System (NAARS) 
database. This database is the product of a joint effort 
between the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) and Mead Data Central. The database 
contains the full text of more than 4,000 annual reports 
for firms traded on the New York and American Stock 
Exchanges and the Over-the-Counter market for each year 
maintained in the NAARS library.
NAARS can be searched using standard search logic 
similar to that used by BRS Information Technologies and 
the IQuest database network offered by CompuServe. In 
addition, NAARS provides numerous search descriptors 
(labels for segments of annual reports) which permit
GEPS = Growth in earnings per share
= (EPS current year - EPS prior year) / EPS prior 
year, where EPS = primary earnings per share 
excluding extraordinary items, discontinued 
operations, and defeasance gains or losses (when 
not already included in extraordinary items)
NRL = Nonrecurring losses as a percentage of total assets
= (Extraordinary losses + Losses from discontinued 
operations + Unusual, nonrecurring or one-time 
charges) / (Total assets + Amount placed in 
defeasance trust)
CR = Current ratio
= (Current assets + Amount placed in defeasance trust) 
/ (Current liabilities + Current debt defeased)
LEV = Leverage ratio
= (Total liabilities + Long-term debt defeased) / 
(Total assets + Amount placed in defeasance trust)
LIQ = Liquid assets as a percentage of total assets
= (Cash + Cash equivalents + Marketable Securities + 
Amount placed in defeasance trust) / (Total assets 
+ Amount placed in defeasance trust)
Figure 3-1. Discriminating Variables for Defeasance 
Decisions Based on the Window Dressing Hypothesis.
researchers to scan specific sections of annual reports 
such as footnotes or extraordinary items. Full text search 
capability ensures that most, if not all, instances of in­
substance defeasance will be identified. Nonetheless, the 
sample is limited by (1) the firms chosen by the AICPA for 
inclusion in the NAARS database, and (2) the adequacy of 
the search strategy. Regarding the latter limitation, a 
search strategy may be too narrowly defined or fail to 
consider atypical disclosures. For example, a search of 
the full text of all footnotes for references to "in­
substance defeasance" or "irrevocable trust" (whether these 
terms appear together or separately) would fail to identify 
a defeased firm that described the defeasance transaction 
as "debt eliminated from the balance sheet."
All annual reports for the period January 1, 1982, 
through November 1, 1988, were included in the search 
population. Since annual reports are generally available 
on-line within 30 days of issuance, all NAARS firms 
reporting 1987 results are included in the sample.
Defeased firms were identified on the basis of key terms 
(e.g., "defeasance" or "irrevocable trust") appearing in 
the footnote section of the annual report.
The search strategy used to select defeasible firms 
was more complex. The sample was selected from the 
population of all firms reporting low-interest debt in 
The Dow Jones Investor’s Handbook for the years 1982 
through 1987. Defeasible firms were selected on a year-by- 
year basis using the average annual yield on 10-year 
Treasury bonds as the benchmark rate. The 10-year Treasury
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bond is an intermediate-term security that yields a return 
between short-term T-bills and long-term (30-year) Treasury 
bonds. This yield provides a reasonable standard for 
identifying low-interest (i.e., defeasible) corporate debt. 
Results of search procedures for defeased and defeasible 
firms were compared against published reports--such as the 
Goodman and Lorensen (1986) survey of defeased firms and 
the Bear Stearns (Calvert 1985, 24-25) listing of 
defeasible firms--to test the thoroughness of the search 
strategy and thei comprehensiveness of the NAARS database.
The Bear Stearns listing identifed defeasible firms on 
the basis of 1) low-interest debt and 2) sufficient liquid 
assets to permit the establishment of a defeasance trust. 
The latter criterion was not used in this study since a 
preliminary review of defeased firms indicated that some 
firms defease only a portion of a debt obligation. Thus it 
is possible for a firm to engage in in-substance defeasance 
of debt by using whatever level of liquid assets may be 
available. Furthermore, a firm interested in recording a 
gain from in-substance defeasance might decide to borrow 
the funds needed to obtain government securities for a 
defeasance trust. Such an arrangement would permit a firm 
to record a gain on defeasance without affecting debt 
ratios (since the borrowed funds would replace the defeased 




The mean and standard deviation of each of the 5
variables listed in Figure 3-1 was computed for both sample
groups (i.e., defeased and defeasible firms). Differences
in sample means were tested using the Wilcoxon ranked-sum
test (equivalent to the Mann-Whitney U-test). This is a
nonparametric univariate test that is appropriate for
comparing the means of two independent samples. The
advantage of this test over comparable parametric tests
(such as the t-test) is that it requires no assumptions
about the distributions of variables. This is especially
important when financial ratios are among the variables
being analyzed. As noted by Foster (1986, 102-103) many
financial ratios are nonnormal:
Some financial ratios have technical limits that 
prevent a normal distribution from being a literal 
description; for example, the current ratio has a 
technical lower limit of zero, whereas the normal 
distribution will include negative values. A similar 
example is the total debt-to-total assets ratio, which 
has both a technical lower limit of zero and a 
technical upper limit of one.
The Wilcoxon ranked-sum test determines whether 2 
samples have been drawn from populations with equal means 
and variances. The technique is based on ranking each 
variable in the combined sample--assigning the rank of 1 to 
the largest value, 2 to the next largest value, etc. The 
ranks are then summed for each group and a statistic
designated as T is calculated. The T-statistic has an 
approximately normal distribution so that calculated values 
of the T-statistic can be compared to a table of critical 
values to determine the statistical significance of 
differences between group means. Since the direction of 
the difference in means is specified for each hypothesis 
(H 1 through H5), one-tailed tests of significance are 
appropriate.
A second set of univariate tests was performed on the 
same set of data in a matched-pairs design. Defeased and 
defeasible firms were matched on the basis of their two- 
digit SIC codes to control for the effect of industry 
membership on leverage ratios. Bowen, Daley, and Huber
(1982) found empirical evidence suggesting that leverage 
ratios vary systematically across industries. DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) theorized that optimal leverage ratios may 
be related to differences in non-cash tax deductions (such 
as depreciation) across industries. For example, capital- 
intensive industries may have leverage ratios that are 
consistently higher than labor-intensive industries. A 
matched-pairs design helps control for such cross-sectional 
variation and permits a more powerful test of the leverage 
variable. This added power for leverage, however, was 
partially offset by a reduction in total sample size.
Since unmatched observations were omitted in the matched- 
pairs design, the total sample size was smaller, thereby
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reducing the power of the test. The appropriate 
nonparametric procedure for analyzing differences in means 
for matched samples is the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed- 
ranks test. Like the Wilcoxon ranked-sum test, the 
procedure uses a T-statistic to determine the significance 
of differences in sample means.
Since the hypothesized window dressing effects of in­
substance defeasance are conceptually related and 
interdependent, correlation analysis was done to test for 
linear dependencies (multicollinearity) among variables and 
to assess the potential usefulnesss of multivariate 
analysis. Multivariate analysis is the appropriate method 
for analyzing the simultaneous effect of all variables on 
the defeasance decision. Two multivariate techniques-- 
logistic regression analysis (logit) and probabilistic 
regression analysis (probit)--are commonly used for cases 
involving qualitative dependent variables. The logistic 
regression technique was used in this study as described in 
the next section.
Multivariate Analysis
Multivariate analysis of qualitative decision 
variables (such as the decision to engage in in-substance 
defeasance of debt) is complicated by the fact that 
qualitative variables generally lead to violations of the 
key assumptions underlying many multivariate techniques.
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For example, when multiple regression is used to fit a line 
to data for which the dependent variable is dichotomous, 
regression coefficients estimated by the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method are no longer optimal (Neter,
Wasserman, and Kutner 1985, 356). Although such estimates 
are unbiased, they are not BLUE (i.e., the Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimators).
Regression analysis is based on the assumption that 
error terms are normally distributed and have constant 
variance across all levels of the independent variable(s). 
These assumptions are not valid for regression involving 
dichotomous dependent variables. In such cases the error 
terms can assume only 2 values for any given level of the 
independent variable. Futhermore, the variance of the 
error terms will differ across different levels of the 
independent variable (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1985,
356). In fact, the OLS estimates of regression 
coefficients have unequal error term variances that vary 
systematically with the values of independent variables.
This affects estimates of sampling variances and, in turn,
f
hypothesis tests based on those sampling variances. "Thus, 
even in the best of circumstances, OLS regression estimates 
of a dichotomous dependent variable are, although unbiased, 
not very desirable" (Aldrich and Nelson 1984, 14).
The problem of unequal variances for error terms can 
be resolved by using a weighted least squares approach. In
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addition, OLS estimators are asymptotically normal when 
samples sizes are large (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1985,
357). Problems arise, however, when regression of a 
qualitative variable is based on a linear model. For 
example, predicted values for a dichotomous variable based 
on a linear model may turn out to be greater than one or 
less than zero. Since the value predicted for a 
dichotomous dependent variable is interpreted as the 
probability that a given outcome will occur (based on given 
levels of the independent variables), such results are 
meaningless and cast doubt on the suitability of the linear 
model itself. There are no a priori reasons for assuming 
that the probability of a given decision outcome should 
behave as a linear response function. If the true 
probability function is curvilinear, the inappropriate use 
of a linear model can create a number of problems:
. . . [T]he incorrect assumption of linearity 
will lead to least squares estimates which (1) have no 
known distributional properties, (2) are sensitive to 
the range of the data, (3) may grossly understate the 
magnitude of the true effects, (4) systematically 
yield probability predictions outside the range of 0 
to 1, and (5) get worse as standard statistical 
practices for improving the estimates are employed 
(Aldrich and Nelson 1984, 30).
Nonlinear Probability Models 
Numerous curvilinear models have been developed to 
estimate the behavior of a dichotomous dependent variable 
that is bounded between values of 0 and 1. Most of these
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models are S-shaped curves that asymptotically approach the 
boundary values. The two models that have received the 
most attention are logistic regression analysis and 
probabilistic regression analysis. Logistic regression 
analysis is based on a logistic response function. The 
natural log transformation of the logistic curve is a 
linear response function. Probabilistic regression 
analysis is based on a cumulative normal probability 
distribution. Except for slight differences in the tails, 
the curves for both models are almost identical:
The logistic and [cumulative] normal curves are 
so similar as to yield essentially identical results. 
In practice they yield estimated choice probabilities 
that differ by less than .02 and which can be distin­
guished, in the sense of statistical significance, 
only with very large samples. The choice between 
them, therefore, revolves around practical concerns 
such as the availability and flexibility of computer 
programs and personal preferences and experience 
(Aldrich and Nelson 1984, 34).
The logistic regression procedure was used in this study
since it was readily available in the SAS computer package
(Harrell 1986, 269).
The assumptions underlying logistic-regression
analysis are generally analogous to the assumptions
underlying the standard regression model (Aldrich and
Nelson 1984, 48-49):
(1) Y depends on k observable variables (X),
(2) the relationship between Y and X is approximated 
by the logistic regression model
E (Y ) = exp(2bkXk )/[1 + exp(IbkXk )]
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(3) observations on Y are statistically independent 
(i.e., no serial correlation), and
(4) no linear dependencies exist across independent 
variables (i.e., no multicollinearity).
The log transformation of the logistic function specified
under assumption (2) above is the linear function Y* =
^ k ^ k '  dependent variable, E(Y), in the original
logistic regression model represents the probability, p, of
a given decision outcome (e.g., in-substance debt
defeasance). The dependent variable in the transformed
logistic regression model represents the log of the odds
favoring a decision outcome, i.e., log[p/(1-p)]. The
logistic regression model for the current study is:
Y ’ = bQ + b.jGEPS + b2NRL + b3CR + b^LEV + b^LIQ.
Definitions of the independent variables used in the model
are summarized in Figure 3-1. The dependent variable in
the model is designated 1 if the firm has defeased debt and
0 if the firm has not defeased.
Interpreting the Results of 
Logistic Regression
For purposes of illustration Figure 3-2 presents an 
abbreviated version of the results of Ayres’ (1986, 155) 
study of the choice between early and late adoption of SFAS 
No. 52 (see Chapter 2). Shown in Figure 3-2 are (1) the 
logistic regression coefficients for each independent vari­
able, (2) tests of the significance of each coefficient,
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and (3) tests of the goodness-of-fit for the overall model. 
Descriptions of the discriminating variables used in Ayres' 
study were presented in Figure 2-5.
______________ Variables__________________
Constant CEPS COVINT DIVURE SIZE/100 DO
Expected Sign ? - -  + - -
Coefficient 0.308 -1.24 -0.219 0.030 -0.019 -0.028
t-value 0.91 -2.92 -1.63 2.57 -3.24 -1.99
Significance (0.182) (0.002) (0.051) (0.005) (0.001) (0.023) 
(one-tailed)
Percentage correctly classified: 6 9 .0%
Value of chi-squared statistic for model: 52.14, d.f.=6
Probability under HO < 0.0001
Dependent variable = 1 if adoption date is 1981, N=103
= 0 if adoption date is 1982 or 1983,
N = 129
Figure 3-2. Logistic Model of SFAS No. 52 Adoption Year 
Decision.
The interpretation of logistic regression coefficients 
is not as straightforward as the interpretation of standard 
regression coefficients. The impact of X on Y is constant 
for standard regression models. Since logistic regression 
is based on a curvilinear model, "the effect of increasing 
X by a unit varies for the logistic model according to the 
location of the starting point on the X scale" (Neter,
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Wasserman, and Kutner 1985, 365). The t-test for logistic 
regression coefficients has the usual meaning —  it tests the 
null hypothesis that a given coefficient is 0 (i.e., has no 
effect on Y). A chi-square test is used to test logistic 
regression coefficients in the SAS procedure.
In standard regression analysis a model's goodness-of- 
fit is assessed by the F statistic. The F statistic tests 
the joint hypothesis that all regression coefficients 
(except the intercept) are zero. Logistic regression 
(using the maximum likelihood estimation method) tests 
goodness-of-fit based on the chi-square statistic. Ayres 
was able to reject the null hypothesis (that all 
coefficients are zero) at the 0.0001 level,based on a chi- 
square statistic of 52.14. This means that the logistic 
regression model is significantly better in classifying 
firms by decision outcome than a naive model that randomly 
assigns firms to decision outcomes based on relative 
frequencies. Another indication of the model's goodness- 
of-fit is the percentage of decision outcomes correctly 
predicted by the model.
Limitations of the Study
The research design used in this study is exploratory 
and nonexperimental. Nonexperimental research is subject 
to two important limitations: (1) the inability to
randomize (i.e., the inability to assign subjects to groups
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at random or assign treatments to groups at random), and
(2) the inability to manipulate independent variables. 
Sample firms in the current study are "self-selected"—
i.e., firms that have defeased debt select themselves into 
one group and firms holding defeasible debt select 
themselves into another group. The danger, of course, is 
that variables other than those pertaining to window 
dressing may systematically distinguish these two groups. 
For example, an important variable omitted from the current 
study is the economic effect of defeasance transactions.
An experimental study could be designed in which the 
independent variables considered in this study are 
systematically manipulated in the context of hypothetical 
financial statements. These hypothetical financial 
statements could then be evaluated by a representative 
sample of corporate financial officers who would be asked 
to make a decision regarding in-substance defeasance of 
debt. The major advantage of such a design is the ability 
to control non-window-dressing variables (such as the 
economic impact of defeasance) either directly or through 
randomization. But experimental research designs also have 
serious limitations. Manipulating window dressing 
variables in hypothetical situations can easily produce 
artificial results that cannot be generalized beyond the 
experimental setting itself. Furthermore, it is unlikely
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that an experimental approach could resolve the research 
question addressed in this study--i.e., whether window 
dressing can be ruled out as a motivating factor in in­
substance defeasance decisions. Data collected in an 
experimental study of in-substance defeasance may not be a 
faithful representation of the actual behavior of managers 
with regard to window dressing— particularly when the 
motivation being investigated is generally condemned. 
Financial managers who may have actually used in-substance 
defeasance as a window dressing tool would be unlikely to 
display such behavior in a hypothetical situation when 
individual self-interest is not at stake.
The interpretation of nonexperimental research 
findings is also subject to limitations. No causal 
inferences can be drawn regarding window dressing and 
defeasance. Nor is it appropriate to draw conclusions 
about the importance of window dressing in relation to 
other potential determinants of defeasance. Conclusions 
drawn from the data collected in this study must be 
confined to the primary research issue--ruling out the 
window dressing motive. Questions concerning the relative 
importance of the window dressing motive and its possible 
interaction with other variables are left for future 
investigations. The present study facilitates future 
research by identifying those aspects of window dressing 
that appear most important to defeasing firms.
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Although nonexperimental research designs do not 
permit causal inferences, it should not be assumed that 
nonexperimental research is inferior to experimental 
research. Many important research questions in accounting 
and economics do not lend themselves to experimental 
research. Regarding the limitations of nonexperimental 
research designs in the social sciences Kerlinger (1986,
358) states:
It is easy to say that experimental research is 
"better" than nonexperimental research, or that 
experimental research tends to be "trivial," or that 
nonexperimental research is "merely correlational." 
Such statements, in and of themselves, are over­
simplifications. What the student of research needs 
is a balanced understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of both kinds of research. To be committed 
unequivocally to experimentation or to nonexperimental 
research may be shortsighted.
CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter reports the results of statistical tests 
and logistic regression of data obtained from samples of 
defeased and defeasible firms. The purpose is to assess 
the role of the window dressing hypothesis in decisions to 
engage in in-substance defeasance of debt. Section 1 
describes the data collection procedure and the reported 
timing of defeasance transactions. Sections 2 and 3 
present the results of univariate tests of each of the 5 
hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 and an analysis of the 
effect of industry as an omitted variable. Section 4 
presents the results of logistic regression analysis. The 
last section provides a brief summary of empirical 
findings.
Data Collection 
Sample of Defeased Firms 
Data for defeased firms were drawn from the NAARS 
database described in Chapter 3. A variety of search terms 
and combinations of terms was used to identify firms that 
have engaged in debt defeasance. The initial search was 
made on the phrase "defeas! or irrevocable trust." The
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exclamation point at the end of "defeas!" results in the 
identification of all annual reports that use any form of 
the root word "defease"— for example, defeasance, defeased, 
defeasing, etc. The connector "or" is used to search for 
annual reports that contain either of the two terms 
specified, but not necessarily both terms.
Results of Initial Search Strategy
The initial search produced a sample of 312 firms for 
the period beginning January 1, 1982, and ending December 
31, 1987. A preliminary review of these annual reports 
revealed that many firms had not engaged in in-substance 
defeasance of debt. For example, firms with pension and 
profit-sharing plans often used the term "irrevocable 
trust" in footnotes to the financial statements. All of 
these firms were included in the initial selection of 312 
firms. In addition, not all firms that defeased debt 
engaged in in-substance defeasance. The term "defease" may 
refer to legal o£ in-substance defeasance. In the legal 
sense, defeasance refers to the early extinguishment of 
debt in accordance with specific written requirements 
contained in a debt covenant. The term "defease" may also 
be used generically to indicate any extinguishment of debt 
or any termination of a property interest in accordance 
with stipulated conditions.
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Results of Modified Search Strategy
The initial selection of firms was screened a second 
time by adding the phrase "and in-substance or insubstance 
or in substance" to the original search criteria. This 
modification produced a selection of only those firms in 
the original group that also used some form of the term 
"in-substance." The modified search strategy reduced the 
size of the preliminary sample, but also excluded firms 
that had, in fact, engaged in in-substance defeasance of 
debt. Consider, for example, the following footnote 
reported by Midwest Energy Company in its 1984 annual 
report:
On December 28, 1984 IPS [Iowa Public Service] 
defeased the $10,000,000 4-1/4$ First Mortgage 
bonds due March 1988 by irrevocably placing in 
trust direct obligations of the United States of 
America sufficient to satisfy the semiannual 
interest payments and the redemption require­
ments. The Bonds are considered to be extin­
guished for financial reporting presentation and 
are excluded from the Consolidated Balance 
Sheet.
This footnote was selected under the initial search 
strategy because it contained a form of the word "defease." 
It was excluded from firms selected under the modified 
search strategy, however, because it failed to mention the 
additional term "in-substance." Futhermore, some firms 
that did not use in-substance defeasance were retained 
under the modified search strategy simply because the 
common phrase "in substance" was used somewhere within the
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annual report. This problem was corrected by specifying 
the proximity of the terms "defeas!" and "in-substance."
The NAARS database permits the user to specify the number 
of words separating search terms.
Description of Final Sample of Defeased Firms
Based on a variety of search strategies, the final 
sample consisted of 93 defeasance transactions by 88 
different firms (5 firms defeased debt in 2 separate 
years). Since observations on each of the 5 variables 
analyzed in this study are unique whether the variables 
pertain to separate firms or separate years for the same 
firm, data analysis was done on the basis of 93 unique 
cases or "firm/years."
The firms included in the final sample have been 
checked against a list of 40 defeased firms generated in a 
similar NAARS search conducted in 1986 and published by the 
AICPA (Goodman and Lorensen 1986, 3). All of the firms 
identified in the 1986 AICPA Financial Report Survey are 
included in the final sample of 93 firm/years. See 
Appendix A for a listing of defeased firms.
f
Another test of the completeness of the final sample 
of defeased firms was obtained by comparing the NAARS 
database selections against search results from another, 
independent database containing firms that report to the 
SEC. The Exchange Service offered by Mead Data Central and 
available under the AICPA Total program contains extracted
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information from SEC filings and annual reports on more 
than 10,300 companies and full-text 10-Q and 10-K reports 
for more than 1 ,500 firms. A search and comparision of 
selections from the Exchange Service provided additional 
assurance that the final sample of 93 firm/years is 
reasonably complete.
Before data analysis was begun, a follow-up search of 
the NAARS database was undertaken to identify cases of in­
substance defeasance occurring after December 31, 1987.
The follow-up search was conducted in November 1988 and 
identified 2 additional firms that engaged in in-substance 
defeasance transactions during fiscal years ending in 
January 1988. Both of these firms were included in the 
final sample of 93 firm/years. Since both firms were 
reporting on 1987 operating results, they were grouped with 
1987 firms for purposes of data analysis.
Data Summary Sheets
For each defeased firm a data summary sheet was 
prepared to summarize information needed for the computa­
tion of each of the 5 variables defined in Chapter 3 (see 
Figure 3-1, page 60). In addition, the data summary sheet 
was used to identify:
1) the amount of debt defeased,
2) the amount of funds placed in trust,
3) the amount of gain (or loss) resulting from in­
substance defeasance,
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4) a brief description of the type of debt defeased 
(including its classification as short-term or 
long-term), and
5) the timing of the defeasance transaction as cited 
in the annual report.
Although the timing of the defeasance transaction is not a
direct factor in the research hypotheses, the window
dressing hypothesis suggests, that the transaction might be
used as a last minute device for strengthening the
appearance of the financial statements. For this reason
the calculation of growth in earnings per share (GEPS) for
defeased and defeasible firms has been confined to a one-
year comparison, rather than focusing on long-term trends
in earnings growth.
An analysis of the timing of defeasance transactions 
supports a short-term approach toward the analysis of 
earnings growth. Of the 93 firm/years included in the 
final sample, 47 cases (51 percent) make reference to a 
specific day, month, or quarter for the in-substance 
defeasance transaction. Of these 47, two-thirds (31 cases) 
defeased in the last quarter of the reporting period. Of 
the 31 cases that defeased in the fourth quarter of the 
reporting period, 16 defeased in the final month and 8 
reported a defeasance transaction occurring within the last 
5 days of the final quarter. Table 4-1 provides a 




REPORTED TIMING OF IN-SUBSTANCE DEFEASANCE TRANSACTION
Number of Percentage 
Firm/Years Firm/Years
First Quarter of Reporting Period 4 8.5
Second Quarter of Reporting Period 6 12.8
Third Quarter of Reporting Period 6 12.8
Fourth Quarter of Reporting Period 31 65.9
Subtotal: Cases specifying quarter 47 100.0
Cases specifying year only 46
Total firm/years 93
Sample of Defeasible Firms 
The NAARS database could not be used to select a 
sample of defeasible firms due to its limited capacity for 
searching numerical information contained within the text 
of annual reports. In order to select a sample of 
defeasible firms it was necessary to identify all firms 
that carry low-interest debt on their balance sheets. As 
described in Chapter 3, "low-interest debt" is defined by 
reference to available yields on U.S. Treasury securities.
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A firm was deemed a potential candidate for in-substance 
defeasance if it carried debt with a stated rate of 
interest less than the average annual yield on 10-year 
Treasury bonds. The average annual yield on Treasury bonds 
was computed on the basis of reported yields on the first 
trading day of each quarter during the research period (see 
Table 4-2). Since funds placed in a defeasance trust by 
U.S. firms are limited to direct obligations of the U.S. 
government (or securities guaranteed or collateralized by 
U.S. government obligations), the 10-year treasury bond 
provides a conservative benchmark of available yields on 
U.S. government securities.
The first step in the selection of a sample of 
defeasible firms was the identification of all firms listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, 
and Over-the-Counter market that carry low-coupon debt.
These firms were identified by comparing the coupon rate 
reported in The Dow Jones Investor's Handbook for the years 
1982 through 1987 to the benchmark rates summarized in 
Table 4-2. The Dow Jones Investor’s Handbook is an annual 
publication listing the description, trading volume, and 
price ranges of all stocks and bonds trading on major U.S. 
and foreign exchanges during the prior year.
Systematic Random Selection of Defeasible Firms
After the population of potential in-substance 
defeasance candidates was determined for a given year,
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TABLE 4-2
AVERAGE ANNUAL YIELD ON 10-YEAR TREASURY BONDS
































































* Source: The Wall Street Journal.
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firms that had engaged in in-substance defeasance 
transactions were eliminated and a systematic random sample 
of the remaining firms was drawn to produce a sample 
comparable in size to the number of defeased firms for that 
year. For example, 2,102 firms qualified as potential 
candidates for in-substance defeasance transactions in 
1984. Of these firms, 35 were selected to produce a sample 
of defeasible firms for 1984 comparable in size to the 
number of defeased firms for 1984. A systematic random 
sample is drawn by obtaining a random start (selected from 
a random numbers table) and selecting every kth item--where 
k equals the population size (2,102 for the year 1984) 
divided by the desired sample size (35). This procedure 
was repeated for each year in the research period to 
produce a total sample of 93 defeasible firm/years (83 
defeasible firms). Some defeasible firms qualified as 
potential defeasance candidates in more than one year, just 
as some firms actually defeased in more than one year.
Table 4-3 provides a summary of defeasance transactions by 
year. See Appendix B for1 a listing of defeasible firms.
Stratification of the sample of defeasible firms in 
direct proportion to defeased firms ensures that the 
economic environment for both defeased and defeasible firms 
is comparable for both samples throughout the 6-year 
research period. Since Treasury bond yields generally
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TABLE 4-3
SUMMARY OF DEFEASANCE TRANSACTIONS BY YEAR OF OCCURRENCE
Number of Firms Engaging in 








declined during the period 1982 through 1987, it would be 
inappropriate to select an unrestricted random sample from 
the period as a whole. That would imply that in-substance 
defeasance is equally likely in each year of the research 
period, regardless of the prevailing yields on U.S. 
government securities needed for defeasance trusts. It is 
more reasonable to expect that both the number of defeased 
firms and the number of defeasible candidates expands and 
contracts with changing economic factors, particularly the 
level of U.S. government security yields.
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Results of Univariate Tests 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4-4 is a summary of descriptive statistics for 
each of the 5 independent variables defined in Chapter 3.
TABLE 4-4








































* GEPS = Growth in Earnings Per Share 
NRL = Nonrecurring Losses
CR = Current Ratio
LEV = Leverage
LIQ = Liquidity
See Figure 3-1 (page 60) for operational definition of 
variables.
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Even before a formal test of differences, it is apparent 
that the average growth in earnings per share (GEPS) is 
markedly higher for defeasible firms--a growth rate of 
31.23 percent for defeasible firms compared to a decline of 
1.73 percent for defeased firms. Furthermore, the (pre­
defeasance) liquidity ratio (LIQ) for defeased firms is 
more than twice that reported by defeasible firms--9.81- 
percent for defeased firms versus 4.26 percent for 
defeasible firms.
Hypothesis 1:
Growth in Earnings Per Share
If window dressing is an important factor in 
management’s decision to engage in in-substance defeasance 
of debt, one of the areas subject to m a n agement 
manipulation is earnings per share. Substantial gains can 
be generated by management's decision to defease low-coupon 
debt whenever the yield on U.S. government securities is 
higher than the coupon rate of corporate debt. Since the 
amount of earnings increase that can be obtained through 
defeasance is limited by the amount of defeasible debt held 
by a firm, it is reasonable to expect that the defeasance 
transaction is more likely to be invoked by firms 
experiencing an unexpected reduction in earnings growth.
The first research hypothesis states that defeasing firms 
will have a smaller percentage growth in earnings
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(exclusive of defeasance gains) compared to defeasible 
firms.
Table 4-5 presents the results of the Wilcoxon ranked- 
sum test of the difference in the growth of earnings per 
share for defeased and defeasible firms. Defeasible firms 
experienced an average rate of growth more than 32 percent­
age points higher than defeased firms (31.23 percent for
TABLE 4-5
WILCOXON RANKED-SUM TEST OF GROWTH IN EARNINGS PER SHARE
Mean Mean One-Tailed
Level Cases Value Rank Z  g_
Defeased Firm 93 -0.0173 84.55 -2.2649 0 .0118
Defeasible Firm 93 0.3123 102.45
Total 186
defeasible firms compared to -1.73 percent for defeased 
firms. This difference is significant at the 0.05 level 
(p = 0.0118). The null form of the first hypothesis is 
rejected based on the univariate test of mean ranks.
Hypothesis 2: Nonrecurring Losses
Hypothesis 2 provides another possible explanation for 
the use of in-substance defeasance as a window-dressing 
technique. Since management can implement the defeasance
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transaction on very short notice, it is hypothesized that 
gains from in-substance defeasance transactions may be used 
to mask unexpected nonrecurring losses. To test this 
hypothesis all such losses— including losses on 
discontinued operations, extraordinary items, and special 
charges--were summed and expressed as a percentage of total 
assets for both defeased and defeasible firms. Table 4-6 
indicates’ that the difference in nonrecurring losses 
between the 2 groups is not significant. The null form of 
hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected.
TABLE 4-6
WILCOXON RANKED-SUM TEST OF NONRECURRING LOSSES
Mean Mean One-Tailed
Level Cases Value Rank Z  p
Defeased Firm 93 0.0112 96.44 0.9398 0.1737
Defeasible Firm 93 0.0060 90.56
Total 186
Hypotheses 3: Current Ratio
Mielke and Seifert (1987, 71) found improvement in the 
current ratios of several defeasing firms. SFAS No. 76 
permits firms to dispose of currently maturing debt as soon
90
as funds are available for the establishment of a 
defeasance trust to cover future principal and interest 
payments. The third hypothesis states that defeasing 
firms will have lower (pre-defeasance) current ratios than 
defeasible firms. Table 4-7 indicates that the current 
ratios of defeased and defeasible firms are not 
significantly different. The upper half of Table 4-7 tests
TABLE 4-7
WILCOXON RANKED-SUM TEST OF CURRENT RATIOS
Test of firms defeasing short-term debt only
Mean Mean One-Tailed
Level Cases Value Rank Z  g_
Defeased Firm 15 1.4807 50.30 -0.5553 0.2894
Defeasible Firm 93 1.6377 55.18
Total 108
Test of all firms
Mean Mean One-Tailed
Level Cases ( Value Rank Z  g_
Defeased Firm 93 1.6878 92.22 -0.3242 0.3724
Defeasible Firm 93 1.6377 94.78
Total 186
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those firms that defeased short-term debt only; the bottom 
half of Table 4-7 tests the difference in current ratios 
for all firms. The null form of hypothesis 3 cannot be 
rejected based on a univariate test of mean ranks.
Hypothesis 4: Leverage
Hypothesis 4 states that firms defeasing long-term 
debt will have higher (pre-defeasance) debt-to-total-assets 
ratios than defeasible firms. If the window dressing 
hypothesis affects the decision to engage in in-substance 
defeasance, management may be motivated to reduce excessive 
debt ratios in order to present a stronger balance sheet or 
increase debt levels subsequent to the defeasance 
transaction without increasing the existing leverage ratio. 
Table 4-8 provides evidence consistent with the window 
dressing hypothesis. The upper half of Table 4-8 presents 
results for 78 firms defeasing long-term debt. The bottom 
half of Table 4-8 compares the leverage ratios of all firms 
in both samples. The difference in leverage ratios is 
significant in both comparisons. The null form of 
hypothesis 4 is rejected at the 0.01 level of significance.
As discussed in Chapter 3, Bowen, Daley, and Huber 
(1982) found empirical evidence suggesting that leverage 
ratios vary systematically across industries. DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) theorized that leverage ratios may vary 
according to specific differences in non-cash tax
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TABLE 4-8
WILCOXON RANKED-SUM TEST OF LEVERAGE RATIOS 








Defeased Firm 78 0.6643 101.05 3.6393 0.0002
Defeasible Firm 93 0.5680 73.38
Total 171
Level Cases







Defeased Firm 93 0.6555 107.06 3.4348 0.0003
Defeasible Firm 93 0.5680 79.94
Total 186
deductions (such as depreciation) according to industry 
type. If such systematic variation exists, it could 
explain all or part of the difference found in the leverage 
ratios of defeased and defeasible firms (see Table 4-8).
For example, if most defeased firms are engaged in capital- 
intensive industries while most defeasible firms are 
devoted to service-oriented activities, then defeased firms
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might be more likely to have higher leverage ratios since 
capital-intensive industries generally require higher 
levels of debt to finance expenditures for plant and 
equipment.
To control for the effect of industry on leverage 
ratios, a second univariate test was performed in which 
defeased and defeasible firms were matched on the basis of 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.
Of the 93 firm/years in each sample, 51 pairs were formed 
on the basis of industry. Firms that could not be matched 
were dropped from the sample. Table 4-9 lists pairs of 
firms/years included in the final sample according to 
industry type.
The appropriate nonparametric procedure for analyzing 
differences in mean leverage for matched samples is the 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. The Wilcoxon 
test takes into account both the magnitude and the 
direction of differences in leverage ratios between 
defeased and defeasible firms. When the number of pairs is 
large (greater than 15) the Wilcoxon T-statistic is 
approximately normally distributed (Kenkel 1984, 745).
Table 4-10 presents the results of the Wilcoxon matched- 
pairs signed-ranks test for the leverage variable. The 
difference in mean leverage ratios between defeased and 
defeasible firms remains significant at the 0.01 level when
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TABLE 4-9
PAIRS OF DEFEASED AND DEFEASIBLE FIRMS BY INDUSTRY TYPE
Two-digit Number of
SIC Code Type of Industry Pairs
13 Oil/gas field services 2
20 Meat products 1
23 Apparel 1
27 Publishing and printing 1
28 Basic chemicals 2
29 Petroleum refining 2
30 Rubber and plastics 2
31 Leather tanning/finishing 1
32 Glass products 2
33 Iron and steel 4
34 Nonferrous metals 3
35 Engines and turbines 4
36 Communications 3
38 Scientific instruments 1
49 Gas and electric 9
50 Wholesale - Automotive 2
53 Retail - Department Stores 1
58 Retail - Restaurants 1
67 Financial institutions 7
70 Hotels and motels 1
80 Medical and health services 1
Total Number of Pairs 51
samples are controlled for industry type. This result 
eliminates industrial classification as a significant 
explanatory variable with regard to differences in leverage 
ratios between defeased and defeasible firms.
95
TABLE 4-10
WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST 
OF LEVERAGE VARIABLE




Number of (pre-defeasance) Wilcoxon 
Variable Pairs Leverage T-Statistic Z
Leverage (LEV) 51 35 (68.6%) 411.0 -2.3622*
* p < 0.01
See Figure 3-1 (page 60) for operational definition of 
variable.
Hypotheses 5: Liquidity
The fifth hypothesis states that defeasing firms will 
have a higher level of (pre-defeasance) liquid assets (as a 
percentage of total assets) than defeasible firms. Liquid 
assets include cash, cash equivalents, and short-term 
investments. Excessive amounts of liquid assets can 
present a problem for management by attracting the interest 
of unwanted suitors or by attracting the attention of 
stockholders who may criticize management for ineffective 
utilization of company resources. In-substance defeasance 
provides management with an opportunity to dispose of large
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amounts of liquid assets in a voluntary transaction that 
can also enhance earnings. Table 4-11 presents the results 
of a univariate test of the difference in mean liquidity 
for defeased and defeasible firms. On average, defeased
TABLE 4-11
WILCOXON RANKED-SUM TEST OF LIQUIDITY RATIOS
Mean Mean One-Tailed
Level Cases Value Rank Z__________ _p
Defeased Firm 93 0.0981 118.55 6.3453 >0.0001
Defeasible Firm 93 0.0426 68.45
Total 186
firms (prior to defeasance) carry a level of liquid assets 
more than double the amount carried by defeasible firms 
(9.81 percent versus 4.26 percent). The null form of 
hypothesis 5 is rejected at the 0.0001 level of 
significance.
*
Results of Multivariate Analysis 
Correlation Analysis 
Financial ratios are often assumed to be closely 
correlated. When explanatory variables in a regression 
model do not vary independently, interpretation of
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regression coefficients becomes very difficult. Logistic 
regression, like ordinary linear regression, is not 
meaningful if significant linear dependencies 
(multicollinearity) exist among independent variables used 
in the regression model. The two most common tests of 
correlation are the Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient and Spearman's rank order correlation 
coefficient (also called Spearman's rho). Spearman's rank 
order correlation coefficient is the appropriate 
nonparametic technique for data that do not meet the 
assumption of bivariate normality (Conover 1980, 251 ).
Table 4-12 shows the Spearman rank order correlation 
coefficients for all 5 variables. Not surprisingly, 
leverage (LEV) and current ratio (CR) display the highest 
measure of correlation (-0.39958, p = 0.0001). Since both 
ratios measure relative levels of debt, it is reasonable to 
expect the current ratio to decline as the debt-to-total- 
assets ratio increases. Although statistically 
significant, a correlation of -0.39958 is not considered a 
high degree of correlation with regard to the problem of 
linear dependency between variables. Correlations must be
0.70 or higher to be regarded as a threat to regression 
analysis (Downing and Clark 1985, 365). The only other 
correlations in Table 4-12 that are statistically signifi­
cant at the 0.05 level are nonrecurring losses (NRL) paired 
with growth in earnings per share (GEPS) and current ratio
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TABLE 4-12
SPEARMAN'S RANK ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AND 
ASSOCIATED SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITIES
Combined Firm/Years (N = 186)
EPS NRL CR LEV LIQ






























(CR) paired with liquidity (LIQ)— showing correlations of 
-0.2845 and 0.1687, respectively. All correlation values 
listed in Table. 4-12 are judged to be moderate or low.
Each of the statistically significant correlations in 
Table 4-12 involves one of two variables— current ratio 
(CR) or nonrecurring losses (NRL). The univariate tests 
discussed in the previous section revealed no significant 
difference in mean ranks for these two variables between 
defeased and defeasible firms. In addition, as
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demonstrated in the next section, neither of these two 
variables qualifies for inclusion in the final logistic 
regression equation.
Results of Logistic Regression Procedure
A logistic regression model (logit) was used to assess 
the joint significance of all 5 variables on the decision 
to engage in in-substance defeasance of debt. The logi'stic 
regression model is based on the assumption that the 
dependent variable can be used to estimate the probability 
that a given observation belongs to one of two groups--
i.e., defeased firms or nondefeased firms. In the logistic 
regression model the logarithm of the odds of belonging to 
one group is a linear function of the variables used for 
classification. Table 4-13 presents a preliminary logistic 
regression model based on all 5 variables, together with a 
classification table of actual versus predicted outcomes.
The preliminary logistic regression model supports the 
results obtained in univariate tests of individual variables 
presented in the previous section. The same 3 variables that 
were consistent with the window dressing hypothesis based on 
univariate analysis are also significant in the preliminary 
logistic regression model. These 3 variables are:
1) growth in earnings per share (GEPS),




PRELIMINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
FOR DEFEASANCE DECISION
Variables
Constant GEPS NRL CR LEV LIQ
Expected Sign ? - + - + +
Coefficient -3.677 -0.745 -0 .055 0.148 4.237 16 .032
Standard Error 1 .025 0.263 5 .400 0.260 1 .336 3 .842
Chi-square 12.87 8.00 0 .00 0.32 10 .05 17.41
Significance 0 .0003 0.0047 0.9919 0.5687 0.0015 <0 .0001
Value of chi-squared statistic for model: 52.79 d.f.=5
Probability under HO < 0.0001 
R = 0.407
Dependent variable = 1 if defeased firm





Negative 1 1 71 I 1 22 ! 1 931
Positive !1 32 ! 61 ! 1 931 "
Total ! 103 I 83 I 186
Percentage correctly predicted: 71-0%
False positive rate: 26.5$
False negative rate: 31.1 $
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All 3 variables are significant at the 0.01 level or better 
in the preliminary model. In addition, regression 
coefficients for all 3 variables carry the predicted sign.
The remaining two variables— nonrecurring losses (NRL) and 
current ratio (CR)--are not statistically significant and 
carry a sign opposite to that predicted.
The SAS LOGIST procedure (Harrell 1986, 269) was used 
to develop the preliminary logistic regression model. The 
SAS procedure calculates a maximum-likelihood estimate 
(MLE) for each regression coefficient. MLE estimators are 
those with the highest probability or likelihood of having 
produced the observed values of the dependent variable. A 
chi-square statistic is used to test individual regression 
coefficients and the joint hypothesis that all coefficients 
(except the intercept) are zero. The chi-square statistic 
for a logistic regression model has the same interpretation 
as the overall F-statistic for an ordinary linear 
regression model. It is an indication of the "goodness-of- 
fit" of the regression model. The chi-square statistic 
for the preliminary logistic regression model is highly 
significant (p < 0.0001).
The multiple regression coefficient (R-squared) is 
another measure of goodness-of-fit for ordinary linear 
regression models using the least squares method. The 
multiple regression coefficient is interpreted as the 
percentage variation in a dependent variable that can be
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explained by variations in the independent variables 
included in the regression model. Although there is no 
statistic in logistic regression analysis with a comparable 
interpretation, the R statistic computed by the SAS LOGIST 
program serves a similar purpose. It measures the 
predictive ability of the logistic regression equation.
The R statistic also includes a correction factor for the 
number of parameters being estimated to ensure that the 
predictive power of the model does automatically increase 
when new variables are added to the model. If the 
correction factor is ignored, the value of the R statistic 
ranges from a minimum value of zero (indicating that the 
model has no predictive ability) to a m a x i m u m  value of 1.0 
(indicating that the model predicts perfectly). The R 
statistic obtained for the preliminary logistic regression 
model is 0.407, suggesting moderate predictive ability.
The R statistic should not be interpreted as an indication 
of causality between dependent and independent variables.
The classification table at the bottom of Table 4-13 
shows the ability of the logistic regression model to
f
distinguish between defeased and nondefeased firms when the 
regression equation is applied to the original data 
observations. In this application logistic regression is 
an alternative to linear discriminant analysis. Logistic 
regression analysis is required for financial ratio data 
since multivariate normality cannot be assumed. The
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preliminary logistic regression model correctly predicted 
71.0 percent of all decision outcomes. This represents a 
moderate improvement over the 50.0 percent rate obtainable 
with a naive prediction model that assigns firms randomly 
to defeased and nondefeased categories. It should not be 
assumed, however, that the preliminary logistic regression 
model will achieve a comparable prediction rate when 
applied to new data.
The preliminary logistic regression model has been 
presented to provide complete information on the 
contribution and significance of all 5 variables tested in
the current study. The value of the model can be improved,
however, by eliminating those variables that do not 
contribute explanatory power. A widely used method for 
selecting variables for inclusion in a regression model is 
the stepwise procedure. This method adds variables to the 
regression model on the basis of predetermined criteria
such as the maximum reduction in the error sum of squares
or, in the case of a logistic regression model, the highest 
likelihood of having obtained the observed decision 
outcomes. Table 4-14 presents the results of the final 
logistic regression model generated by the stepwise option 
of SAS LOGIST. To enter and remain in the model an added 
variable must have a level of significance less than 0.05.
Elimination of nonsignificant variables using the 
stepwise regression procedure improved model results in
TABLE 4-14






















Value of chi-squared statistic for model: 
Probability under HO < 0.0001 
R = 0.424
52.46 d.f.=3
Dependent variable = 1 if defeased firm













I 62 I 93 
1
Total I 103 ! 83 ! 186
Percentage correctly predicted: 72.0%
False positive rate: 25.3%
False negative rate: 30.1$
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nearly all respects. The 3 variables included in the final 
model carry the predicted sign and each of the regression 
coefficients is highly significant (p < .01 for all 3 
variables). The chi-square statistic (which tests the 
joint significance of all 3 variables) is comparable to the 
value obtained in the preliminary model, and the R 
statistic has increased from 0.407 to 0.424. In addition, 
decision outcomes correctly predicted by the final logistic 
regression model have increased from 71 percent to 72 
percent.
Summary of Results
A sample of 93 defeased firms was selected by 
searching 2 independent computer database services for the 
period January 1, 1982, through November 1, 1988, and 
comparing search results to published information on firms 
that have engaged in in-substance defeasance of debt. A 
second sample of potential defeasance candidates was drawn 
from the population of all firms listed in The Dow Jones 
Investor's Handbook that carried debt with a stated rate of 
interest less than the average annual yield on 10-year U.S. 
Treasury bonds. Values for 5 variables were computed and 
compared for the combined sample of 186 firm/years:
1) growth in (pre-defeasance) earnings per share,
2) nonrecurring losses as a percentage of total assets,
3) current ratio,
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4) leverage (debt-to-total-assets ratio), and
5) liquidity (cash and short-term investments as a 
percentage of total assets).
The major research question of this study is based on 
the window dressing hypothesis. Specifically, can the 
window dressing hypothesis be used to identify 
statistically significant differences in the financial 
statement characteristics of defeased and defeasible firms? 
Five research hypotheses were developed to investigate the 
major research question. A summary of the results of 
univariate tests (the Wilcoxon ranked-sum test) of each 
hypothesis appears in Table 4-15. In addition, the overall 
significance of all 5 variables was analyzed using a 
logistic regression model. Summary results of the final 
regression model are presented in Table 4-16.
Three variables were found to be statistically 
significant in both univariate and multivariate analyses. 
Liquidity (LIQ) as measured by the ratio of cash and short­
term investments to total assets was found to be the most 
significant variable in the defeasance decision. The mean 
liquidity ratio for defeased firms was more than double the 
ratio for nondefeased firms (9.8 percent for defeased firms 
compared to 4.3 percent for nondefeased firms). Liquidity 
was also the most significant explanatory variable in both 
the preliminary and final logistic regression models.
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TABLE 4-15 




HI: The (pre-defeasance) earnings Rejected
growth of defeased firms is at p < 0.05
least as great as that of 
defeasible firms.
H 2 : The amount of (pre-defeasance) non- Fail to
recurring loss reported by defeased reject
firms is no greater than that of 
defeasible firms.
H 3 : The (pre-defeasance) current ratio Fail to
of firms defeas,ing current debt is reject
at least as great as that of 
defeasible firms.
H 4 : The (pre-defeasance) debt-to-total- Rejected**
assets ratio of firms defeasing p < 0.01
long-term debt is no greater than 
that of defeasible firms.
H 5 : The (pre-defeasance) liquidity Rejected
ratio of Jefeased firms is no p < 0.0001
greate. ; nan that of defeasible 
firms.
* Based on the Wilcoxon ranked-sum test.
** Also rejected using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs, signed- 
ranks test (p < 0.01). Pairs were matched on the basis 








Constant LIQ LEV GEPS
Coefficient -3.330 16.537 4.020 -0.749
Significance <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0015 0.0038
Value of chi-squared statistic for model: 52.46 d.f.=3
Probability under HO < 0.0001 
R = 0.424
Percentage correctly predicted: 72.0$
Dependent variable = 1 if defeased firm
= 0 if nondefeased firm, N = 186
* GEPS = Growth in Earnings Per Share 
LEV = Leverage 
LIQ = Liquidity
See Figure 3-1 (page 60) for operational definition of 
variables. •
The leverage (LEV) ratio and growth in earnings per 
share (GEPS) ranked second and third in importance, 
respectively, in both univariate and multivariate analyses. 
The mean leverage ratio for defeased firms was almost 9
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percent higher than that for nondefeased firms (65.6 
percent for defeased firms versus 56.8 percent for 
nondefeased firms). The difference in mean leverage ratios 
between defeased and defeasible firms was also significant 
when firm/years were matched on the basis of 2-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Defeased 
firms carried a higher leverage ratio in 35 of 51 matched 
firm/year pairs (68.6 percent). The difference in leverage 
ratios for matched pairs remained significant at the 0.01 
level.
Growth in earnings per share for nondefeased firms was 
more than 32 percentage points higher than defeased firms. 
The average growth in earnings per share for nondefeased 
firms was 31.2 percent, compared to an average decline of 
1.7 percent for defeased firms. Univariate tests of the 
remaining two variables--nonrecurring losses (NRL) and 
current ratio (CR)--revealed no significant difference 
between defeased and nondefeased firms. Both variables 
were eliminated from the final logistic regression model 
using the stepwise regression technique.
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to examine the financial 
characteristics of firms engaging in in-substance 
defeasance of debt to determine whether the window dressing 
motive can be ruled out as a significant factor in the 
defeasance decision. The first section of this chapter 
presents a summary of empirical findings and their 
implications. The remaining two sections deal with the 
limitations of this study and suggestions for future 
research.
Summary and Implications 
Origin of Research Question 
In one of the earliest articles appearing in the 
financial press on the use of in-substance defeasance by 
corporations, the issue of "window dressing" was raised. 
Professor Roman Weil declared, "It's the season for window 
dressing," in an article for Barron's published shortly 
before Christmas in 1983 (Weil 1983, 76). He was referring 
to the FASB's late-November approval of corporate in­
substance defeasance. Since then, in-substance defeasance 
has been variously described as "cosmetic accounting"
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(Blumstein 1984, D1) and "something that creates large 
discretionary increases in income" (John C. Burton quoted 
in Grant 1984, 3). Some have urged the FASB to ban in­
substance defeasance before auditors are forced to defend 
the practice in a court of law by plantiffs claiming that 
the provisions of SFAS No. 76 produce misleading, perhaps 
fraudulent, financial statements (Gaumnitz and Thompson 
1987, 105).
Despite the concerns of many in the accounting 
community, very little research has been done on the 
effects of in-substance defeasance on corporate financial 
statements. Furthermore, there has been no empirical 
investigation of the charge that corporate managers use in­
substance defeasance as a window dressing technique. The 
purpose of this study was to determine whether the charge 
of window dressing can be ruled out as a significant factor 
in decisions involving in-substance defeasance of debt.
Testing the Window Dressing 
Hypothesis
A direct test of the window dressing hypothesis would 
be difficult, if not impossible. It would require a 
knowledge and understanding of the inner motives and 
intentions of corporate managers who make defeasance 
decisions. The goal of this study, therefore, is limited 
to an investigation of indirect evidence regarding the 
window dressing hypothesis. For example, one of the most
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common charges made against in-substance defeasance is that 
it permits corporate managers to window dress the income 
statement by including large discretionary gains in 
reported earnings per share.
In the absence of the window dressing motive, it is 
reasonable to expect that firms engaging in in-substance 
defeasance of debt, and firms with the potential to engage 
in in-substance defeasance of debt, would show comparable 
growth in (pre-defeasance) earnings per share for years in 
which defeasance transactions occur. On the other hand, if 
defeasance transactions are used primarily as a window 
dressing technique to bolster sagging profits, it might be 
expected that firms engaging in in-substance defeasance of 
debt would have lower earnings growth compared to 
defeasible firms in the year of defeasance.
Summary of Empirical Evidence
Earnings Growth
Empirical evidence shows that the window dressing 
motive cannot be ruled out as a significant factor in the 
defeasance decision with regard to the manipulation of 
earnings. An analysis of 93 in-substance defeasance 
transactions during the period 1982 through 1987 revealed 
that firms engaging in in-substance defeasance experienced 
earnings growth rates substantially lower (after 
eliminating the effect of defeasance) than a random sample
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of potential defeasance candidates. In fact, defeased 
firms showed an average decline of 1.7 percent in earnings 
per share compared to an average increase of 31.2 percent 
for defeasible firms--a difference that is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level.
This finding gives credence to those who oppose SFAS 
No. 76 on the grounds that in-substance defeasance of debt 
may be used to manipulate reported earnings per share. An 
informal analysis of the timing of defeasance transactions 
is consistent with this conclusion. Of those firms that 
specified the time of year in which the defeasance 
transaction occurred, nearly two-thirds reported debt 
defeasance in the final quarter of the reporting period.
If the defeasance tra'nsaction is being used solely for its 
economic or financial benefits, why should those benefits 
appear more compelling in the final quarter of a firm's 
reporting period in nearly 2 out of 3 cases?
Leverage Ratio
Another research hypothesis related to the window 
dressing motive concerns the use of in-substance defeasance 
as a device for reducing long-term debt on the balance 
sheet, thereby reducing important leverage ratios such as 
the debt-to-total-assets ratio. Firms with lower-than- 
average leverage ratios are commonly perceived by investors 
and analysts as financially stronger and more likely to 
survive an economic downturn. Managers of highly levered
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firms, on the other hand, may find it difficult to obtain 
new financing in both credit and equity markets. Since 
corporate management can move large amounts of debt from 
the balance sheet to a footnote by in-substance defeasance, 
managers may be motivated to use the transaction to window 
dress the balance sheet.
If window dressing has no effect on the defeasance 
decision, the leverage ratios of defeased firms should not 
be significantly greater than those of defeasible firms. 
Empirical evidence regarding this hypothesis shows, 
however, that the (pre-defeasance) leverage ratios of 
defeased firms are significantly higher than those of 
defeasible firms. The average leverage ratio of a firm 
engaging in ib-substance defeasance during the the six-year 
period from 1982 through 1987 was 65.6 percent, compared to 
an average ratio of 56.8 percent for defeasible firms.
This difference is significant at the 0.01 level even when 
firms are matched to control for industry type.
L iquidity
A third hypothesis concerns the liquidity of defeased
F
and defeasible firms. In-substance defeasance requires the 
establishment of an irrevocable trust for the future 
payment of interest and principal on defeased debt.
Substantial amounts of liquid assets may be placed in such 
trusts, permanently removed from the face of the balance 
sheet. Since excessive balances in liquid asset accounts
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can provoke criticism from shareholders, management may be 
sensitive to the amount of liquid assets reported on the 
balance sheet. Furthermore, liquid assets may be an 
important factor in hostile takeovers since the liquid 
assets of acquired firms can be used to pay off loans 
obtained to finance the acquisition. Corporate managers 
can solve both of these problems by depositing excess 
liquid assets in a defeasance trust. Manipulation of this 
kind might be described as window dressing for specific 
target audiences.
If window dressing has no effect on the defeasance 
decision, the liquidity levels of defeased and defeasible 
firms should be comparable. On the other hand, if in­
substance defeasance is being used to remove excess 
liquidity from the balance sheet, the liquidity ratios of 
defeased firms (prior to defeasance) should be 
systematically higher than those of defeasible firms.
Based on empirical evidence, defeased firms carried an 
average level of liquid assets more than twice as high as 
defeasible firms during the period 1982 through 1987 (9.8 
percent for defeased firms compared to 4.3 percent for 
defeasible firms). This difference is statistically 
significant at the 0.0001 level.
Current Ratio and Nonrecurring Losses
Two other hypotheses dealing with differences in 
current ratios and nonrecurring losses were not confirmed.
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There was no evidence to indicate that firms defeased 
current debt obligations to window dress the balance sheet 
by increasing the current ratio. Nor was there any 
evidence to suggest that defeasance gains were used to mask 
unexpected nonrecurring losses.
Each of the 3 variables for which significant 
differences were found (liquidity, leverage, and growth in 
earnings per share) were also analyzed jointly in a 
logistic regression model. Regression coefficients for all 
3 variables were significant at the 0.01 level and a chi- 
square test of the overall model was significant at the 
0.0001 level. Applying the model to data collected in the 
original sample resulted in correct prediction of 
defeasance outcomes in 72 percent of all cases. This 
result suggests that the 3 variables identified in this 
study might be used to identify those firms most likely to 
engage in in-substance defeasance of debt. Such 
information would be useful to investment bankers seeking 
defeasance clients as well as analysts and investors trying 
to predict a firm's future financing activities.
Major Conclusion
The major conclusion of this study is that the window 
dressing hypothesis cannot be ruled out as a significant 
factor influencing the decision to engage in in-substance 
defeasance of debt. Empirical evidence shows that firms
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with higher-than-average liquidity and leverage ratios, and 
lower-than-average growth in earnings per share, are more 
likely to engage in in-substance defeasance of debt than 
firms holding defeasible debt, but without those financial 
characteristics. Although the inner motivation of 
corporate managers who make in-substance defeasance 
decisions remains unknown, the results of this study show 
that the window dressing motive is consistent with 
defeasance decisions made between 1982 and 1987.
This conclusion has important implications for the 
FASB, as well as those who audit, analyze, or invest in 
firms engaging in in-substance defeasance of debt. The 
FASB is currently reconsidering the provisions of SFAS No. 
76 as part of its long-term special project dealing with 
financial instruments and off-balance-sheet financing. The 
findings of this study suggest that the provisions of SFAS 
No. 76 may warrant separate and immediate review. The FASB 
cannot afford to ignore an accounting practice that 
provides an opportunity for manipulating financial results 
in ways that are potentially misleading. This is 
especially true when the FASB itself is directly 
responsible for granting that opportunity.
While waiting for the FASB to complete its review, 
auditors of defeased firms may wish to consider ways to 
improve the disclosure and financial statement presentation
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of in-substance defeasance transactions —  including, 
perhaps, a caption on the face of the balance sheet 
regarding the amount of debt defeased. By providing more 
detailed information on in-substance defeasance 
transactions, auditors can help to discourage possible 
window dressing applications. While the results of this 
study do not show that in-substance defeasance causes 
financial statements to be misleading, they do show that 
the window dressing motive cannot be safely ignored in 
evaluating the effects of in-substance defeasance on 
financial statement presentation. Corporate management 
makes the final decision to engage in in-substance 
defeasance of debt, but the independent auditor must make 
the final judgment regarding the motives and rationale 
underlying this transaction to ensure fair presentation of 
the financial statements.
The factors identified in this study--excessive 
liquidity, high leverage, and declining earning growth--are 
also very important to financial analysts and investors. 
Each of these characteristics requires careful 
consideration of both current causes and future 
implications. When firms exhibiting these characteristics 
also engage in in-substance defeasance of debt, an added 
measure of concern may be warranted. Careful review of the 
factors identified in this study may help auditors,
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analysts, and investors identify those firms that are most 
likely to be influenced by the window dressing motive.
Limitations of the Study 
Limitations Related to Methodology 
Several limitations of this study were discussed in 
Chapter 3 with regard to methodology. The most important 
of these are the limitations inherent in all nonexperi- 
mental research designs. Such designs are characterized by 
an inability to manipulate independent variables or 
randomly assign subjects to treatment and control groups.
The effect of these limitations is felt in the interpreta­
tion of research results. Despite significant empirical 
findings, it is not possible to infer causality between 
dependent and independent variables in a nonexperimental 
research design. The strongest conclusion that can be 
drawn based on the evidence gathered in this study is that 
the window dressing motive cannot be eliminated as a 
significant factor in the defeasance decision.
It is not appropriate to conclude that in-substance 
defeasance transactions are, in fact, caused or motivated 
by management's desire to window dress the financial 
statements. Nor is possible to assess the relative 
importance of the window dressing motive compared to other 
possible motivating factors. Nonetheless, the results of 
this study should not be dismissed as trivial or
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unimportant. Every research investigation must begin with 
an identification of those variables which theory and 
common sense have identified as potential contributors to 
an unexplained phenomenon. The task of identifying 
significant explanatory variables for complex phenomena 
such as those commonly found in accounting and other social 
sciences should not be underestimated. The research process 
usually begins with attempts to rule out potentially 
significant variables. This study represents an initial, 
effort to identify the explanatory variables underlying the 
decision to engage in in-substance defeasance of debt.
Another limitation of this study concerns the nature 
of debt defeased during the six-year period from 1982 
through 1987. Firms engaging in in-substance defeasance 
did not confine the transaction to low-coupon corporate 
bonds'. The types of debt defeased during this period 
include notes, mortgages, revolving credit agreements, 
capitalized leases, and industrial revenue bonds. All of 
these debt obligations are represented in the sample of 93 
defeasance transactions collected for this study. The
f
defeasible sample, on the other hand, was drawn from a 
population of firms having low-coupon corporate debt 
trading on major U.S. exchanges during the same period of 
time. Firms with other types of debt are not directly 
represented in the sample of defeasible firms, although 
many of the firms that carried low-interest bonds also
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carried other forms of defeasible debt. Nonetheless, the 
results of this study are valid only to the extent that the 
financial characteristics of firms included in the 
defeasible sample are representative of firms holding other 
types of defeasible debt besides low-interest bonds.
Limitations Related to the Disclosure of 
In-Substance Defeasance Transactions
There are also several limitations related to the 
nature of in-substance defeasance disclosures. The amount 
of information disclosed about the defeasance transaction 
varies among firms. Some firms did not identify the 
specific obligations defeased or the exact amount of gain 
or loss realized. SFAS No. 76 requires only that firms 
provide a general description of the defeasance transaction 
and the amount of debt considered extinguished. Firms are 
not required to disclose the exact amount of defeasance 
gain or loss.
In those cases where no gain or loss was mentioned, 
the amount was assumed to be zero. The same assumption was 
applied to a number of cases in which firms stated that 
"there was no significant effect on earnings" as a result 
of the defeasance transaction. This assumption may have 
introduced a bias into the computation of one of the 
variables used in the study (growth in earnings per share). 
Since all variables were adjusted to eliminate the effects
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of defeasance, the assumption of zero gain for cases in 
which no information was available may have caused an 
overestimation of growth in (pre-defeasance) earnings per 
share for defeased firms. This assumption provides, 
however, a stronger test of the difference in mean earnings 
growth between defeased and defeasible firms.
The flexibility of disclosure permitted by SFAS No. 76 
also created problems in identifying the sample of defeased 
firms. As described in Chapter 4, a variety of search 
techniques was used to identify those firms that engaged in 
in-substance defeasance of debt from 1982 through 1987. 
Nonetheless, there is no assurance that all NAARS firms 
engaging in in-substance defeasance during the research 
period have been included in the sample of defeased firms. 
Furthermore, the sample of defeased firms is limited to 
those firms with annual reports appearing in the NAARS 
database.
Suggestions for Future Research
Since it is now known that the window dressing motive 
cannot be eliminated as a significant factor in the 
defeasance decision, additional research is needed to 
determine how much improvement in the financial statements 
results from this transaction. The variables used in this 
study were adjusted to eliminate the effect of in-substance 
defeasance to ensure a valid comparison of the financial
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statement characteristics facing corporate managers when 
considering the defeasance transaction. Now that 
significant differences in firm characteristics have been 
found, it would be helpful to know whether any significant 
reduction of these differences occurs as a result of the 
defeasance transaction.
Another interesting area of research concerns the 
selection of debt to be defeased and the timing of the 
defeasance transaction. When firms carry several different 
types of defeasible debt such as notes, bonds, and capital 
leases, what criteria do managers use to select among them? 
Also, what criteria are used in timing the defeasance 
transaction? Why do most in-substance defeasance decisions 
occur late in the reporting period?
A related research question concerns possible capital 
reorganization of firms defeasing low-coupon bonds.
Several firms included in the sample of defeased firms 
reported significant increases in leverage in the year 
following the year of defeasance. This suggests that 
another motive for in-substance defeasance may be a desire 
to reorganize the capital structure of the firm.
Finally, additional exploratory research is required 
to identify other explanatory factors underlying the 
defeasance decision. One way to identify such variables is 
to focus on those defeased firms that do not display the 
characteristics found to be significant in this study
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(i.e., reduced earnings growth, high leverage, or excessive 
liquidity). A number of firms in the defeased sample* for 
example, reported no significant gain from the defeasance 
transaction. In addition, several firms reported losses on 
defeasance. It may be that these firms have such high 
levels of leverage or liquidity that management is willing 
to use in-substance defeasance with or without a gain on 
the transaction. Additional research is needed to 
determine why corporate managers engage in in-substance 
defeasance when there is no significant improvement in the 
financial characteristics considered in this study. In 
summary, a number of difficult research questions must be 
answered before any final conclusions may be formed 
regarding the factors underlying the defeasance decision.
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